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ABSTRACT 
At present, there are two military commission cases involving 
terrorism defendants incarcerated at Guantánamo Bay making 
their way through the appellate courts.  In both cases, the 
defendants are challenging their convictions for “providing 
material support for terrorism.”  While this is a federal offense that 
could be prosecuted in an Article III court, the legal issue in these 
appeals is whether providing material support is also a war crime 
subject to the jurisdiction of a military tribunal.  Congress 
incorporated the offense into the Military Commissions Act, but 
that is not dispositive, since it is arguably beyond Congress’s 
legislative competence to create war crimes out of whole cloth and 
then impose them on foreign nationals having no jurisdictional 
nexus to the United States. 
As a result, the Government has not disputed that there must 
be at least some historical evidence that the conduct now styled 
“providing material support” to an enemy previously has been 
treated as a war crime, where the defendant was a non-resident 
alien who owed no duty of allegiance to the injured state.  In what 
might be fairly described as a desperate attempt to discharge its 
burden of persuasion, the Government has now embraced the only 
“precedent” that comes close to fitting this description.  This is 
problematic, however, because it is also one of the most notorious 
episodes in the history of American military justice. 
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In 1818, then Major General Andrew Jackson led an armed 
invasion of Spanish Florida, thereby instigating the First Seminole 
War.  In the course of the conflict, his troops captured two British 
citizens who had been living in Florida among the Seminole 
Indians.  In his inimitable style, Jackson impetuously ordered the 
summary trial and execution of these men, allegedly for “inciting” 
the Seminoles to engage in “savage warfare” against the United 
States.  Worse yet, Jackson’s immediate motivation for the invasion 
was to recapture fugitive slaves, who had escaped from the 
adjacent States and found refuge among the Seminoles.  In 
addition to territorial expansion, his mission was to return this 
“property” to their “rightful” owners and prevent Florida from 
serving as a safe haven for runaway slaves. 
Remarkably, the legal basis of the Government’s assertion of 
military jurisdiction over material support charges therefore rests 
on Jackson’s decision to execute two men, who were almost 
certainly innocent, in the context of a war of aggression waged to 
vindicate the property rights of antebellum Southern slaveholders.  
The purpose of this essay is to reintroduce the episode to a wider 
audience, and to reflect on the implications of the Government’s 
decision to rely on it as a precedent for a modern war crimes 
prosecution. 
 
“Nations frequently rush into the arms of despotism for the avowed 
reason of finding security against anarchy . . . .  Liberty requires that 
every one should be judged by his common court.  All despots insist on 
extraordinary courts, courts of commission, and an easy application of 
martial law.”1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The outer boundaries of Congress’s discretion to “define and 
punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations”2 as a matter of 
municipal penal legislation remains an open question.  In 1865, the 
Attorney General put down a marker when he opined that while 
Congress has largely unfettered discretion “to make” rules for the 
management of the armed forces that did not previously exist, “[t]o 
define is to give the limits or precise meaning of a word or thing 
 
1 FRANCIS LIEBER, ON CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT 17, 228 (1853). 
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.  
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[already] in being . . . Congress has the power to define, not to 
make, the laws of nations.”3  If the distinction between “making” 
and “defining” is substantially correct, it suggests that Congress 
has the flexibility to “modify on some points of indifference” when 
it acts to incorporate the laws of war into the domestic code, but 
could not reasonably be construed as having a license to create 
new offenses out of whole cloth under the guise of providing 
definitional certainty.4  Insofar as originalism matters in 
constitutional interpretation, there is an impressive body of 
evidence that supports this reading of the original meaning of the 
Define and Punish Clause.5 
For this reason, in ongoing litigation under the Military 
Commissions Act (MCA),6 the Government has not disputed the 
 
3 Military Comm’ns, 11 Op. Att’y Gen. 297, 299 (1865). 
4 See id. (citing Who Privileged From Arrest, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 26, 27 (1792)) 
(“The law of nations, although not specifically adopted by the constitution or any 
municipal act, is essentially a part of the law of the land.  Its obligation 
commences and runs with the existence of a nation, subject to modification on 
some points of indifference.”). 
5 See Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: 
Terrorism and the Intersection of National and International Law, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
121, 141 (2007).  
[T]his is not to say that the founders intended to give Congress free rein 
to determine offenses against the law of nations . . . .  It is clear from the 
drafting history of the Clause that only offenses established by the 
“consent” of nations, to use [Chief Justice] Marshall’s phrase, would 
qualify.  Congress could not create offenses, but retained only the 
second-order authority to assign more definitional certainty to those 
offenses already existing under the law of nations at the time it 
legislated. 
Id.; Jordan J. Paust, In Their Own Words: Affirmations of the Founders, Framers, and 
Early Judiciary Concerning the Binding Nature of the Customary Law of Nations, 14 
U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 205, 220, 225 (2008) (“Necessarily, any modification 
of the law of nations had to be [on a point] of indifference . . . .  Congress was 
given a non-exclusive power to ‘define’ or at least to clarify offenses against the 
law of nations . . . .”); Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress’s 
Power to “Define and Punish . . . Offenses Against the Law of Nations,” 42 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 447, 474 (2000) (“The debates at the Constitutional Convention made clear 
that Congress would have the power to punish only actual violations of the law of 
nations, not to create new offenses.”). 
6 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 10, 18, and 28 U.S.C.), amended by 
Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–84, tit. 18, 123 Stat. 2574 
(codified in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.).  For the purposes of this Article, the 
differences between the 2006 and 2009 versions of the MCA need not detain us. 
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proposition that there must be at least some relevant historical 
evidence that “the conduct now criminalized by the [statute] has 
[previously] been recognized as a violation of the law of war.”7  
Yet, several of the offenses codified in the MCA notoriously have 
no grounding in the standard menu of sources for identifying the 
substantive content of customary international law, namely “the 
works of jurists,” “the general usage and practice of nations,” and 
“judicial decisions recognising and enforcing that law.”8  Perhaps 
most conspicuously, Congress incorporated the federal crime of 
“providing material support for terrorism” into the MCA,9 despite 
the fact that this is a novel statutory offense that was not even 
conceived until the mid-1990s, and has never been considered a 
law-of-war offense by any other nation.10 
 
7 United States v. Hamdan, 2 M.C. 1, 5 (2008).  Importantly, the Government 
has also conceded that the source of Congress’s authority to enact the MCA is 
derived from the Define and Punish Clause.  Compare Appellee’s Response to the 
Specified Issues at 1–2, United States v. al Bahlul, CMCR Case No. 09–001 (U.S. Ct. 
Mil. Comm’n Rev. Mar. 11, 2011) [hereinafter Gov’t Response (al Bahlul)], with 
Appellant’s Reply on the Certified Issues, United States v. al Bahlul, CMCR Case 
No. 09–001 (U.S. Ct. Mil. Comm’n Rev. Mar. 15, 2011).  See also WILLIAM 
WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 831 (2d rev. ed. 1920).  
The Constitution confers upon Congress the power ‘to define and punish 
offences against the law of nations,’ and in the instances of the legislation 
of Congress during the [Civil War] by which it was enacted that spies 
and guerillas should be punishable by sentence of military commission, 
such commission may be regarded as deriving its authority from this 
constitutional power. 
Id. 
8 United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160–61 (1820). 
9 10 U.S.C. § 950(t)(25) (2006) (defining the offense of “providing material 
support for terrorism” by reference to the parallel federal criminal statute, 18 
U.S.C. § 2339A, which was enacted in 1994).  To date, most detainees at 
Guantánamo Bay, against whom charges have been referred, have been charged 
with at least one count of providing material support for terrorism.  See U.S. DEP’T 
OF DEF., OFFICE OF MIL. COMM’N, Military Commissions Cases, available at 
http://www.mc.mil/CASES/MilitaryCommissions.aspx (providing case files for 
Military Commission cases).  
10 See Legal Issues Regarding Military Commissions and the Trial of Detainees for 
Violations of the Law of War: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Armed Serv., 111th Cong. 
7–9 (2009).  
After careful study, the administration has concluded that appellate 
courts may find that “material support for terrorism” . . . is not a 
traditional violation of the law of war.  The President has made clear that 
military commissions are for law of war offenses.  We thus believe it 
would be best for material support to be removed from the list of 
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Remarkably, in what might charitably be described as a 
desperate attempt to discharge its burden of persuasion, the 
Government has now fully embraced the only “precedent” that 
comes close to fitting this description.  This is problematic, 
however, because it is also one of the most notorious episodes in 
the annals of American military justice.  In 1818, then Major 
General Andrew Jackson led an armed invasion of Spanish Florida, 
thereby instigating what historians have since designated the First 
Seminole War.  In the course of the conflict, his troops captured 
two British citizens, Alexander Arbuthnot and Robert Ambrister, 
who had been living in Indian Territory before the outbreak of the 
war.  In his inimitable style, Jackson managed to precipitate a 
major international incident, as well as the first full-scale 
congressional investigation in the nation’s history, when he 
impetuously ordered the summary trial and execution of these 
men, allegedly for “inciting” the Seminoles and their black allies to 
engage in “savage warfare” against the United States.  If the 
jingoistic overtone does not seem like a promising beginning to the 
story, it gets worse.  William Winthrop, who is widely 
 
offenses triable by military commission, which would fit better with the 
statute’s existing declarative statement. 
Id. (statement of Jeh C. Johnson, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def.).   
[T]here are serious questions as to whether material support for 
terrorism or terrorist groups is a traditional violation of the law of war . . 
. .  Although identifying traditional law of war offenses can be a difficult 
legal and historical exercise, our experts believe that there is a significant 
risk that appellate courts will ultimately conclude that material support 
for terrorism is not a traditional law of war offense, thereby reversing 
hard-won convictions and leading to questions about the system’s 
legitimacy. 
Id. at 9–12 (statement of David S. Kris, Assistant Att’y Gen., Nat’l Sec. Div., Dep’t 
of Justice); JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 40752, THE MILITARY 
COMMISSIONS ACT OF 2006: BACKGROUND AND PROPOSED AMENDMENTS 10 (2009) 
(“[D]efining as a war crime the ‘material support for terrorism’ does not appear to 
be supported by historical precedent.”); Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering 
Terrorism, Human Rights Council, ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/6/17/Add.3 (Nov. 
22, 2007) (by Martin Scheinin) (“[T]he offences listed in Section [950t](24)–(28) of 
the [MCA] (terrorism, providing material support for terrorism, wrongfully 
aiding the enemy, spying, and conspiracy) go beyond offences under the laws of 
war.”); David Glazier, A Self-Inflicted Wound: A Half-Dozen Years of Turmoil Over 
the Guantánamo Military Commissions, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 131, 177 (2008) 
(“[W]hile providing material support to terrorism is clearly an offense against U.S. 
federal law, its trial as a war crime seems unprecedented.”). 
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acknowledged to be the leading authority on American military 
law,11 actually concluded that Jackson himself was guilty of murder 
for ordering the execution of Ambrister contrary to the court 
martial’s verdict.12 
Although Jackson’s role in the executions of Arbuthnot and 
Ambrister is perhaps familiar ground for scholars who specialize 
in antebellum American history, the Government’s decision to rely 
on the incident to legitimize a modern war crimes prosecution 
casts it in an entirely new light.  The purpose of this Article, then, is 
to reintroduce the episode to a wider audience, and to reflect on 
implications of the Government’s decision to invoke the case for 
the contemporary use of military commissions.  Part 2 briefly sets 
the stage by situating the discussion in the context of the 
justification of the State’s imposition of criminal sanctions as such.  
Part 3 explains the Government’s theory for the extraordinary 
assertion of military jurisdiction over non-resident aliens who 
provide material support to those engaged in hostilities against the 
United States.  The heart of the Article is Parts 4 and 5, which 
examine in some detail Jackson’s conduct of the First Seminole War 
and the court martial proceedings resulting in the executions of 
Arbuthnot and Ambrister.  Finally, I conclude that the prosecutors’ 
dubious invocation of this case, purportedly in furtherance of the 
public good, reveals the moral bankruptcy of its legal position.  
2. POLITICAL LEGITIMACY AND THE PRACTICE OF 
PUNISHMENT 
The nature and source of political obligation has been a vexing 
theoretical question since at least the seventeenth century, when 
Thomas Hobbes suggested that the best way to quell religiously 
inspired violence was to submit all questions of social morality to 
the Sovereign’s unfettered discretion.13  As we know from bitter 
experience, this doesn’t work.  To be sure, the threat of coercion 
 
11 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 597 (2006) (referring to Winthrop as 
“the Blackstone of Military Law” (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 19 n.38 
(1957))). 
12 WINTHROP, supra note 7, at 464–65 (describing Jackson’s order to execute 
Ambrister as “wholly arbitrary and illegal,” and opining that “[f]or such an order 
and its execution a military commander would now be indictable for murder”). 
13 See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Michael Oakeshott ed., 1962) 
(1651). 
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might be sufficient to induce compliance in the short run, but no 
government, even the most autocratic, can in the long run govern 
exclusively through brute force.  This is true for the simple reason 
that the actual exercise of political power is continuously 
dependent on the willingness of substantial numbers of people to 
comply with the dictates of the regime, including, among others, 
“the hand that holds the key, the judge that shuffles the papers, 
and the person who chooses whether or not to file charges.”14  
Power alone thus cannot be the exclusive source of the obligation 
of obedience, contra Hobbes, since that power itself is the product 
of widespread allegiance to the State. 
As such, the official infliction of criminal sanctions is never 
merely a naked instrument for utilizing collective violence as a 
means of exercising social control.  Instead, as Keally McBride has 
persuasively argued, the practice of punishment is also the 
simultaneous expression of the ideals inherent in a political order, 
the manifestation of some greater good that purports to justify the 
State’s exercise of coercive authority over the lives and property of 
those subject to its jurisdiction, “whether that be service to God, 
impartial courts, the light of reason, or the necessity of power.”15  
The bureaucrats who administer the system of punishment must 
therefore “demonstrate that they deserve their unique privileges 
because they serve the larger interest of justice . . . .  As soon as 
punishment is entirely about the power of command[,] it . . . will 
quickly destroy the tenuous connection between power and justice 
cultivated by all regimes.”16 
Accordingly, a regime stakes its legitimacy on the extent to 
which its penal practices conform to its professed ideals.  Where 
theory and practice persistently conflict, the resulting cognitive 
dissonance tends to undermine the stability of the legal system 
and, in extreme cases, provokes active resistance.  In Hannah 
Arendt’s striking phrase, a vibrant public sphere can be 
maintained “only where word and deed have not parted company, 
where words are not empty and deeds not brutal . . . .”17  Where 
this “tenuous connection” is broken, and public discourse about 
 
14 KEALLY MCBRIDE, PUNISHMENT AND POLITICAL ORDER 79 (2007). 
15 Id. at 10. 
16 Id. at 150. 
17 HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 200 (1958).  
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social justice comes to be widely regarded as insincere and 
oppressive, the resulting distrust will invariably cause civic life to 
be governed by force and violence rather than persuasion. 
The practice of punishment thus involves an intricate balancing 
act in which the state attempts to fill the normative gap between an 
ideal of social order and the disorderly reality of the human 
condition.  In the United States, the animating political creed 
includes above all a basic commitment to the inherent moral 
equality of each individual.  This principle is affirmed, for 
example, in the enigmatic rhetoric of the Declaration of 
Independence.  But it would be anachronistic to read the 
Declaration’s famous assertion that “all men are created equal” as 
an endorsement of the modern conception of egalitarianism.18 
Instead, it was meant in the classical liberal sense that no one is 
by nature subject to the authority of another person without his 
consent, and that political freedom consists in preserving the 
security of natural rights under the rule of law.  “Freedom of Men 
under Government,” Locke wrote, “is, to have a standing Rule to 
live by, common to every one of that Society . . . A Liberty to follow 
my own Will in all things, where the Rule prescribes not; and not 
to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, Arbitrary Will 
of another Man.”19  Hence, Francis Lieber’s maxim that civil liberty 
depends on the existence of a “common court” to adjudicate legal 
disputes, as opposed to an “easy application” of ad hoc military 
tribunals.20 
 
18 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 1 (U.S. 1776).  As John Diggins 
points out, it was Lincoln, not Jefferson, who transformed our understanding of 
the Declaration “by explaining equality as a moral imperative rather than as a 
scientific postulate, an ideal to be pursued rather than a fact to be assumed, a 
‘proposition’ rather than a truism.”  John P. Diggins, Slavery, Race, and Equality: 
Jefferson and the Pathos of the Enlightenment, 28 AM. Q. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 206, 217 
(1976).   
19 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 302 (Peter Laslett ed. 1960) 
(1690). 
20 See LIEBER, supra note 1, at 228 (“Liberty requires that every one should be 
judged by his common court.  All despots insist on extraordinary courts, courts of 
commission, and an easy application of martial law.”).  
[T]he law shall be superior to all and every one and every branch of 
government; that there is nowhere a mysterious, supreme and 
unattainable power, which, despite of the clearest law, may still dispense 
with it, or arrest its course.  This is the sum total of modern civil liberty, 
the great, firm, and solid commons’ liberty. 
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On the Lockean account, when human beings quit the state of 
nature and enter into civil society, it is rational for them to “give up 
. . . [the] power of punishing to be exercised by such alone as shall 
be appointed to it amongst them; and by such Rules as the 
Community, or those authorised by them to that purpose, shall 
agree on.”21  Each member of a political community thus alienates 
or transfers his or her natural right to punish those who violate 
their rights to the State, which is charged with the responsibility to 
exercise this “executive power” on their behalf in furtherance of 
“the common good.”22  In this view, the practice of punishment is 
thus legitimate insofar as it secures “the two core elements of a 
liberal regime,” namely “the rights of individuals and the bounds 
upon state power.”23 
Broadly speaking, these principles find constitutional 
expression in a complex web of institutions that are meant to 
demarcate a robust sphere of personal liberty, ranging from the 
prohibitions on ex post facto prosecution, compelled self-
incrimination and cruel punishments to the guarantees of equal 
protection and trial by a politically independent judiciary.  As 
George Kateb reminds us: 
Whatever the actual adherence to these ideals by officials of 
the law . . . the Constitution’s system of criminal law is a 
model of almost delicate restraint and inhibition in the 
exercise of state power and hence in the manner in which 
those who are caught in the toils of the law are to be 
treated.24 
As Kateb suggests, the point of imposing such procedural 
constraints on the State’s prosecution of crime is not merely to 
protect the rights of the innocent or the truth-finding function of a 
trial, as opposed to the preservation of other social values.  For 
example, the normative justification of the privilege against self-
 
2 FRANCIS LIEBER, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ETHICS 294 (1839). 
21 LOCKE, supra note 19, at 370. 
22 See id. at 347, 368, 389 (discussing generally individuals’ surrender of the 
right to punish wrongdoers to an executive authority as part of the Lockean social 
contract).   
23 MCBRIDE, supra note 14, at 122. 
24 George Kateb, Punishment and the Spirit of Democracy, 74 SOC. RES. 269, 276 
(2007). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011
03 MORISON (DO NOT DELETE) 10/30/2011  9:37 PM 
130 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 33:1 
incrimination is not solely to avoid the risk of false convictions.  On 
the contrary, practicing lawyers are typically reluctant to allow 
their clients to testify precisely because it might prove too 
revealing. 
Rather, the injunction against self-incrimination arises largely 
because there is something deeply disquieting about the State’s 
coercing even a guilty person to implicate himself in a crime.  From 
a liberal perspective anyway, such a spectacle is offensive because 
it is degrading and accords insufficient respect for the equal worth 
of the defendant as a member of the moral community, 
notwithstanding his offense.  Indeed, even Hobbes, though 
frequently portrayed as an apologist for absolutism, maintained 
that an individual has an inalienable right of self-preservation and 
is thus never required to cooperate in his own punishment.25  This 
remains true, even though faithful adherence to such constraints 
almost certainly frustrates the State’s efforts to give the guilty the 
punishment they arguably deserve.  In this way, then, 
constitutional norms establish a moral minimum that the State may 
not transgress in the pursuit of social order, thereby preserving 
and to some extent instantiating competing moral values like 
respect and personal dignity. 
3. AIDING THE ENEMY UNDER THE LAW OF WAR 
 In the grand tradition of American military justice, the 
foregoing principles of legality have been extended even to enemy 
aliens captured on the battlefield, much less to civilian non-
combatants.  “These principles would reach every man’s case,” 
Henry Clay said in 1819, “native or foreigner, citizen or alien.  The 
instant quarters are granted to a prisoner, the majesty of the law 
surrounds and sustains him, and he cannot lawfully be punished” 
unless “the law condemns [his actions] and . . . [the sentence] is 
pronounced by that tribunal which is authorized by the law to try 
him.”26 
Yet, the continuing vitality of these ideals is thrown into stark 
relief by the Government’s contemporary invocation of military 
 
25 For an illuminating discussion of Hobbes’s philosophy of punishment, see 
Alice Ristroph, Respect and Resistance in Punishment Theory, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 601 
(2009).  
26 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 645 (1819) (statement of Henry Clay).  
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commissions in the ongoing “war on terrorism.”  Historically, 
Congress had incorporated the entire corpus of the common law of 
war into the Articles of War by oblique reference, leaving it to the 
courts to assess the application of the law on a case-by-case basis.27  
In sharp contrast, the MCA adds an entirely new subchapter to the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which applies only to 
non-citizens deemed to be “unprivileged belligerents,” who are 
subjected to trial by military commission for thirty specific 
statutory law-of-war offenses.28  In a transparent attempt to 
insulate the statute from serious jurisdictional and ex post facto 
challenges,29 Congress disclaimed that it had engaged in any 
legislative innovation when codifying these offenses in the MCA.30 
 
27 See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942) (“By the Articles of War, and 
especially Article 15, Congress has explicitly provided, so far as it may 
constitutionally do so, that military tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try 
offenders or offenses against the law of war in appropriate cases.”).  When the 
Articles of War were reenacted as the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1950, 
Congress retained this provision (now codified as Article 21), which “preserved 
what power, under the Constitution and the common law of war, the President 
[previously] had had before 1916 to convene military commissions—with the 
express condition that the President and those under his command comply with 
the law of war.”  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 592–93 (2006). 
28 See 10 U.S.C. § 948a(7) (2009) (defining “unprivileged enemy belligerent as 
one who has engaged in hostilities against or has purposefully and materially 
supported hostiles against the United States, or was a part of al Qaeda); 10 U.S.C. 
§ 948c (2009) (subjecting alien unprivileged enemy belligerents to trial by a 
military commission); 10 U.S.C. § 950t(1)–(30) (2009) (listing offenses triable by 
military commission). 
29 See Eugene Kontorovich, The “Define and Punish” Clause and the Limits of 
Universal Jurisdiction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 149, 151 (2009) (arguing that the “Define 
and Punish Clause limits Congress's power to criminalize conduct that lacks a 
U.S. nexus.”); Stephen I. Vladeck, The Laws of War as a Constitutional Limit on 
Military Jurisdiction, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 295 (2010) (detailing the legal history 
of and constitutional limitations on the jurisdiction of military commissions). 
30 See 10 U.S.C. § 950p(d) (2009). 
The provisions of this subchapter codify offenses that have traditionally 
been triable by military commission.  This chapter does not establish new 
crimes that did not exist before the date of the enactment of this 
subchapter . . . but rather codifies those crimes for trial by military 
commission.  Because the provisions of this subchapter codify offenses 
that have traditionally been triable under the law of war or otherwise 
triable by military commission, this subchapter does not preclude trial 
for offenses that occurred before the date of the enactment of this 
subchapter . . . . 
Id. 
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Of course, the mere fact that Congress says so does not 
necessarily make it true, ipse dixit.  Indeed, the most natural 
reading of the statute’s declarative statement is that Congress must 
have intended the offenses enumerated in the MCA to possess a 
certain historical pedigree in international humanitarian law.  In an 
effort to discharge this jurisdictional burden, the Government has 
taken the position that the offense of providing material support 
for terrorism as codified in the MCA is—in substance if not in 
name—a version of “aiding the enemy,” which does have a 
longstanding provenance in American military law.31 
Taken at face value, this is a singularly unconvincing 
argument.  Logically, it begs the question to suggest that an enemy 
alien violates the injunction against “aiding the enemy” by 
providing material support to his own co-belligerents, at least in 
the absence of special circumstances giving rise to a duty of 
allegiance to the injured State.  Without this factual predicate, the 
concept of “aiding the enemy” would have no limiting principle.  
In that case, it would follow that any enemy alien, including the 
members of an enemy’s armed forces, could be subjected to 
prosecution for war crimes merely for engaging in hostilities 
against the United States, even if the conduct at issue otherwise 
scrupulously complied with the laws of war.  But this amounts to 
the absurd proposition that United States may unilaterally declare 
itself to be legally immune tout court from the hazards of armed 
conflict.  No plausible construction of the law of war supports such 
a conclusion. 
Rather, as William Winthrop explained more than a century 
ago, the prohibition on aiding the enemy is grounded in the rule of 
non-intercourse, a principle of customary international law which 
provides that “all the inhabitants of the belligerent nations or 
districts become, upon the declaration or initiation of a foreign 
war, or of a civil war, . . . the enemies both of the adverse 
government and of each other, and all intercourse between them is 
 
31 See Gov’t Response (al Bahlul), supra note 7, at 21 (“Appellant’s material 
support for terrorism can legitimately be characterized as equivalent to conduct 
constituting the offense of Aiding the Enemy, as historically punished under the 
laws of war by military commissions.”); Appellee’s Response to the Specified 
Issues at 14–15, United States v. Hamdan, CMCR Case No. 09-002 (U.S. Ct. 
Military Commission Review Mar. 11, 2011) [hereinafter Gov’t Response 
(Hamdan)] (using the same language as Gov’t Response (al Bahlul) to describe the 
offense of Aiding the Enemy). 
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terminated and interdicted.”32  The Supreme Court regularly 
embraced the logic of the rule during the Civil War, observing that: 
The people of the loyal States . . . and the people of the 
Confederate States . . . became enemies to each other, and 
were liable to be dealt with as such without reference to 
their individual opinions and dispositions.  Commercial 
intercourse and correspondence between them were 
prohibited . . . by the accepted doctrines of public law.  The 
enforcement of contracts previously made between them 
was suspended, partnerships were dissolved, and the 
courts of each belligerent were closed to the citizens of the 
other . . . .33 
The rule of non-intercourse was invoked as recently as the 
Korean War, when several U.S. soldiers who had provided 
propaganda for their captors were prosecuted under the UCMJ’s 
version of aiding the enemy, now codified at Article 104.34  The 
defendants’ status as prisoners of war being held on foreign soil 
was not dispositive, because in the case of citizens, the “impassable 
‘line’ between belligerents is not geographic. . . .  Whatever the 
place, whether within or without an area controlled by the United 
States, there can be no unauthorized intercourse between a citizen 
of the United States and an enemy.”35  To be sure, a duty of 
 
32 WINTHROP, supra note 7, at 776–77 (footnotes omitted); see also HENRY W. 
HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 357 (1861) (“[A] declaration, or recognition of war, 
effects an absolute interruption and interdiction of all commercial intercourse and 
dealings between the subjects of the two countries.”); Joseph Story, Additional Note 
on the Principles and Practice in Prize Causes, reprinted in NOTES ON THE PRINCIPLES 
AND PRACTICE OF PRIZE COURTS 28, 69 (Frederick Thomas Pratt ed., 1854) (“It is a 
fundamental principle of Prize Law, that all trade with the enemy is prohibited to 
all persons, whether natives, naturalised citizens, or foreigners domiciled in the 
country during the time of their residence, under the penalty of confiscation.”). 
33 Dow v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 158, 164–65 (1879).  Given the absence of a formal 
declaration of war, Congress codified the rule with the enactment of the Non-
Intercourse Act, in order to give unequivocal notice of the illegality of continued 
business dealings between residents of the Northern and Southern states.  See 
Matthews v. McStea, 91 U.S. 7, 12–13 (1875) (citing Act of July 13, 1861, ch. 3, § 5, 
12 Stat. 255, 257 (1859–1863) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 205 (2006)). 
34 10 U.S.C. § 904 (2006). 
35 United States v. Dickenson, 6 C.M.A. 438, 450–51 (C.M.A. 1955); see also 
United States v. Olson, 7 C.M.A. 460, 466 (C.M.A. 1957) (“Accused’s position is 
not essentially different from that of American citizens interned within enemy 
territory. . . .  The obligation of allegiance which attaches to citizenship continues 
to rest upon the shoulders of one so situated.”); United States v. Batchelor, 7 
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allegiance is not an express element of the offense under Article 
104, but in practice this invariably has been assumed.36  Congress 
presumably agrees, moreover, because the counterpart to Article 
104 in the MCA makes explicit the necessary “breach of an 
allegiance or duty to the United States . . . .”37 
 
C.M.A. 354, 368 (C.M.A. 1956) (describing aiding the enemy as “closely akin to 
treason”). 
36 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 584 U.S. 557, 600 n.32 (2006) (“[T]he crime of 
aiding the enemy may, in circumstances where the accused owes allegiance to the 
party whose enemy he is alleged to have aided, be triable by military commission 
pursuant to Article 104 of the UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 904.”); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 
U.S. 507, 558–59 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (“[A] plurality of 
this Court, asserts that captured enemy combatants (other than those suspected of 
war crimes) have traditionally been detained until the cessation of hostilities and 
then released.  That is probably an accurate description of wartime practice with 
respect to enemy aliens.  The tradition with respect to American citizens, however, 
has been quite different.  Citizens aiding the enemy have been treated as traitors 
subject to the criminal process.”); Olson, 7 C.M.A. at 464 (“[W]hether or not an 
offense [under Article 104] has been alleged depends upon the facts alleged, and 
the factual allegations are to be found in the specifications, not in the designation 
of the charge or article.”).  Importantly, the same principle applied in war crimes 
prosecutions after the Second World War.  For example, in 1948, a Nazi officer 
who had served as a prison warden in the Netherlands during the war was 
convicted of various law-of-war offenses and sentenced to seven years 
imprisonment.  See Trial of Willy Zuehlke, 14 UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES 
COMMISSION, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 139 (1949).  In an effort to 
secure a longer sentence, the prosecutor argued that the defendant’s crimes fell 
within the terms of the Dutch penal code’s version of aiding the enemy, which 
provided that whoever “in time of war intentionally lends assistance to the enemy 
or prejudices the State with respect to the enemy, shall be punished with 
imprisonment not exceeding fifteen years.”  Id. at 141 n.1.  The court rejected this 
argument because “[i]f the latter were to be applied it would mean that the 
defendant, being an enemy, would have ‘lent assistance’ to himself, and this was 
not the type of case covered by [the statute].”  Id. at 141.  This was true despite the 
fact that the Nazi occupation of the Netherlands was itself a criminal act of 
aggression, but that did not render every subsequent act by a Nazi official within 
occupied territory a war crime.  Id. at 144.  Thus, a Nazi official could not be 
convicted of “aiding the enemy” merely for lending assistance to his own 
government within territory under the occupation of the German military, 
because in these circumstances he owed no duty of allegiance to the Netherlands. 
37 10 U.S.C.A. § 950t(26); see also U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., OFFICE OF MIL. COMM’N, 
Manual for Military Commissions, Part 21(26), cmt. 3 (April 27, 2010), available at 
http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/2010_Manual_for_Military_Commissions.pdf. 
The requirement that conduct be wrongful for this crime necessitates that 
the accused owe allegiance or some duty to the United States of America.  
For example, citizenship, resident alien status, or a contractual 
relationship in or with the United States is sufficient to satisfy this 
requirement so long as the relationship existed at a time relevant to the 
offense alleged. 
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Accordingly, the gravamen of aiding the enemy is not merely 
that support is given, but the breach of fidelity it entails, where the 
obligation of allegiance attaches to those who by reason of their 
citizenship or residence enjoy the reciprocal protection of the 
injured State.  The “obligation of fidelity and obedience which the 
individual owes to the government under which he lives” is thus 
assumed “in return for the protection he receives.”38  Whereas a 
citizen owes “an absolute and permanent allegiance to his 
government,” a resident alien owes “a local and temporary 
allegiance,” which obligates him “to obey all the laws of the 
country” during the period of residency “not immediately relating 
to citizenship,” and makes him “equally amenable with citizens for 
any infraction of those laws.”39 
Although the status of the recipient of the material support as 
an enemy is a necessary element of the offense, this is not sufficient 
to establish a violation of the norm.  Rather, the critical question is 
the relationship between the putative defendant and the offended 
belligerent.  Simply put, providing material support to the enemies 
of the United States, by itself, has never been considered a war 
crime, unless the provider is under a legal obligation to refrain.  It 
follows that violations of the injunction against aiding the enemy 
are necessarily “treasonable in their nature.”40 
 
Id. 
38 Carlisle v. United States, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 147, 154 (1872). 
39 Id. 
40 WINTHROP, supra note 7, at 629; see also JOHN O’BRIEN, A TREATISE ON 
AMERICAN MILITARY LAWS, AND THE PRACTICE OF COURTS MARTIAL: WITH 
SUGGESTIONS FOR THEIR IMPROVEMENT 148 (Philadelphia, Lea & Blanchard 1846) 
(explaining that aiding the enemy can only apply “to those owing allegiance, 
either permanently or temporarily, (as in the case of foreign occupied conquered 
provinces) to the United States” but “could never be supposed to apply to an alien 
enemy . . . .”); Jabez W. Loane, Treason and Aiding the Enemy, 30 MIL. L. REV. 43, 80 
(1965) (characterizing aiding the enemy under Article 104 as “the military law of 
treason”); Thomas Marmon, et al., Military Commissions 22–23 (April 1953) 
(unpublished LL.M. Thesis, The Judge Advocate General's School) (on file with 
The Judge Advocate General's School Library), available at 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/mil_commissions.pdf.  
[Article 104] is a strictly national offense that can be committed in the 
United States by resident aliens and at any place of contact with enemy 
persons by United States citizens . . . .  [N]ational treason and the 
statutory offense of aiding the enemy are based on the higher duty, 
although it may be one arising from temporary residence, of allegiance to 
the injured state. 
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Not surprisingly, both civilian and military tribunals have 
consistently held that a U.S. citizen or a resident alien violates the 
rule of non-intercourse if he provides material support to an 
opposing belligerent by, for example, “running or attempting to 
run a blockade; unauthorized contracting, trading or dealing with, 
enemies, or furnishing them with money, arms, provisions, [or] 
medicines.”41  Conversely, a non-resident alien commits no offense 
under international law merely by providing the same sort of 
material support to insurgents engaged in hostilities against the 
United States, because all else equal, he is under no legal obligation 
to abstain from such activities.42 
Confronted with the weight of contrary authority, the 
Government argues that:  
[T]he offense of Aiding the Enemy has also been applied to 
situations in which a person providing aid or support to an 
enemy has done so in violation of some [other] duty . . . to a 
sovereign, namely a duty not to provide aid or support to 
an enemy waging an unlawful belligerency, or who is 
 
Id. 
41 WINTHROP, supra note 7, at 839–40; see also WAR DEP’T, BUREAU OF MILITARY 
JUSTICE, DIGEST OF OPINIONS OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE ARMY ch. II, ¶ 
14, at 79 (1865) (“Because blockade-running involves a forfeiture of goods, it does 
not follow that it is not triable by a military commission.  It involves a criminal 
responsibility also, and when engaged in by citizens of the United States, owing 
allegiance to its government, it is clearly so triable.”); War Dep’t, Adjutant 
General’s Office, G.C.M.O., No. 254 (1864) (approving the findings and sentence 
of the military commission of J. B. Sabels, “a citizen owing allegiance to the United 
States,” who was found guilty of giving “aid and comfort [to] the enemy,” by 
using a blockade running vessel to deliver substantial quantities of munitions “to 
enemies in arms against the United States”). 
42 See Young v. United States, 97 U.S. 39, 66 (1877) (holding that a non-
resident British citizen “committed no crime against the laws of the United States 
or the laws of nations” by providing material support to the Confederacy, 
including arms, ammunition and money, because in the absence of a duty of 
allegiance he was “not a traitor”); Green v. United States, 8 Ct. Cl. 412, 420 (1872) 
(holding that “no crime can be imputed” to a non-resident alien for giving 
“material aid . . . to the rebellion”); La Plante v. United States, 6 Ct. Cl. 311, 311 
(1870) (holding that the rule of non-intercourse does not apply to non-resident 
aliens); Report of Maj. L. C. Turner to Col. James A. Hardie (June 4, 1864), in THE 
WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION 
AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, Ser. 2, vol. 7, at 194–95 (U.S. War Dep’t ed., 
Washington, Gov’t Printing Office 1899) (discussing the decision of a military 
commission which held that non-resident aliens did not violate the laws of war by 
serving on blockade running vessels carrying contraband to the Confederacy). 
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waging a belligerency that violates the laws and customs of 
war.43   
Although its briefs are conspicuously silent on the source of this 
purported duty, the Government does manage to locate a single 
instance in which a non-resident alien was punished by an 
American military tribunal for what might be fairly described as 
providing material support to a party engaged in hostilities against 
the United States, namely Andrew Jackson’s decision to execute 
Arbuthnot and Ambrister for aiding the Seminoles Indians and 
their black allies during the First Seminole War.  At best, one 
anomalous result is an exceedingly thin reed to support the 
Government’s burden of persuasion.  In any event, whether this is 
a morally respectable precedent depends entirely on the facts of 
the case and the quality of Jackson’s decision. 
4. “A SAVAGE NEGRO WAR” 
 Given the dearth of historical evidence supporting its legal 
position, the Government resorts to the argument that Jackson’s 
decision to execute Arbuthnot and Ambrister may serve as a 
legitimate precedent for trying alien enemies on material support 
charges under the MCA, even though the defendants admittedly 
did not receive “a fair and impartial trial.”44  For present purposes, 
the procedural irregularities that infected the underlying 
proceedings are a matter of indifference, the Government suggests, 
because Jackson would have been justified under the extant law of 
war if he had ordered the men to be executed without affording 
them any due process whatsoever.  The defendants were not 
entitled to such consideration, the argument goes, because by 
joining in league with the functional equivalent of a terrorist 
organization engaged in “unlawful hostilities” against the United 
States, they had forfeited the right to be treated any better than 
their “savage” associates.  While recognizing that international law 
no longer permits suspected terrorists to be summarily executed 
after being taken into custody, the Government insists that the case 
is sufficient to establish the legal principle that non-resident aliens 
 
43 Gov’t Response (al Bahlul), supra note 7, at 19; see also Gov’t Response 
(Hamdan), supra note 31, at 15–16. 
44 Gov’t Response (al Bahlul), supra note 7, at 24 n.13; see also Gov’t Response 
(Hamdan), supra note 31, at 18 n.39. 
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“may today be the subject of war crimes charges” if they provide 
material support to those engaged in an unlawful belligerency, 
even in the absence of a duty of allegiance to the United States.45 
Even so, the logic of this argument depends entirely upon the 
assumption that the Seminoles’ mode of warfare made them the 
functional equivalent of present-day terrorists.  Otherwise, the 
defendants’ trial and execution on the ostensible grounds that they 
were guilty of aiding unlawful belligerents cannot possibly be 
good law, particularly given the serious procedural defects in the 
underlying proceedings, which the Government does not contest.  
By its own lights, if the Seminoles weren’t actually engaged in an 
unlawful belligerency, Arbuthnot and Ambrister must have been 
wrongfully executed, and the case is a worthless precedent.  
Hence, without citing a shred of credible historical evidence to 
substantiate the charge, the Government baldly asserts that: 
[N]ot only was the Seminole belligerency unlawful, but, 
much like modern-day al Qaeda, the very way in which the 
Seminoles waged war against U.S. targets itself violated the 
customs and usages of war.  Because Ambrister and 
Arbuthnot aided the Seminoles both to carry on an 
unlawful belligerency and to violate the laws of war, their 
conduct was wrongful and punishable.46 
 
45 Gov’t Response (al Bahlul), supra note 7, at 19; see also Gov’t Response 
(Hamdan), supra note 31, at 15–18.  The Government’s stance ignores Justice 
Douglas’s admonition that it “is foreign to our thought to defend a mock hearing 
on the ground that in any event it was a mere gratuity.  Hearings that are 
arbitrary and unfair are no hearings at all under our system of government.”  
Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 187 (1948) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
46 Gov’t Response (al Bahlul), supra note 7, at 25; see also Gov’t Response 
(Hamdan), supra note 31, at 19 (arguing that the case constitutes “evidence [that] 
the United States has punished conduct like Appellant’s material support for 
terrorism at military commissions, even in the absence of any duty or allegiance 
on the part of the accused.  Consequently, Appellant’s conviction for material 
support to al Qaeda is not ex post facto.”).  At oral argument before the CMCR, 
counsel for the Government in Hamdan reiterated the comparison, stating that 
“the substance” of Arbuthnot and Ambrister’s crimes “was the savage killing of 
civilians,” whereas “the goal . . . of al Qaeda is the savage killing of Americans 
wherever they find them throughout the world.”  Col. (Ret.) Francis Gilligan, Oral 
Argument at 34:15, United States v. Hamdan, CMCR Case No. 09-002 (U.S. Ct. 
Mil. Comm’n Rev. Mar. 17, 2011), available at http://www.mc.mil/CASES 
/USCourtofMilitaryCommissionReview.aspx (follow “Salim Ahmed Hamdan” 
hyperlink under “Case Name”; then follow “Recording of Oral Argument” 
hyperlink).  
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The only “evidence” the Government presents to support this 
depiction of the Seminoles is (1) Jackson’s own justification of his 
order to execute the defendants, (2) several post hoc statements 
issued by President Monroe and Secretary of State John Quincy 
Adams in an effort to quell the political fallout caused by the 
controversy, and (3) the fact that Jackson’s partisan supporters in 
the House of Representatives narrowly defeated the 
recommendation of the Military Affairs Committee to issue an 
official censure of the general’s actions.47  In particular, the 
Government highlights President Monroe’s State of the Union 
message to Congress in 1819, in which he reiterates the claim that 
Arbuthnot and Ambrister were not entitled to any legal protections 
in virtue of their association with unlawful belligerents: 
Men who thus connect themselves with savage 
communities, and stimulate them to war, which is always 
attended, on their part, with acts of barbarity the most 
shocking, deserve to be viewed in a worse light than the 
savages.  They would certainly have no claim to an 
immunity from the punishment, which, according to the 
rule of warfare practised by the savages, might justly be 
inflicted on the savages themselves.48 
While the Government dutifully acknowledges that “Jackson’s 
actions were not without controversy,” it recites the foregoing facts 
as if they are sufficient to vindicate the legitimacy of the asserted 
legal principle.49  “[I]n the end,” the Government credulously 
asserts, “his actions were supported by the President and Secretary 
of State, and the House of Representative expressly voted down a 
resolution of disapproval.”50  But this is plainly insufficient to 
discharge the Government’s burden of persuasion, because the 
mere fact that Jackson and his political defenders issued a series of 
self-serving rationalizations for what he had done quite obviously 
does not necessarily mean his actions were legally defensible.  It 
 
47 See Gov’t Response (al Bahlul), supra note 7, at 23–25; see also Gov’t 
Response (Hamdan), supra note 31, at 16–18 (same). 
48 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 13 (1818), quoted in Gov’t Response (al Bahlul), supra 
note 7, at 23–24 and Gov’t Response (Hamdan), supra note 31, at 17. 
49 Gov’t Response (al Bahlul), supra note 7, at 25; Gov’t Response (Hamdan), 
supra note 31, at 18.   
50 Id. 
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might just as easily mean they were trying to obfuscate Jackson’s 
illegal execution of two British citizens, who were actually innocent 
of any crime under the law of war. 
Indeed, when viewed in context, the evidence strongly 
suggests that is exactly what occurred.  Over and above the 
execution of two British citizens, Jackson’s decision to occupy the 
Spanish garrisons at St. Marks and Pensacola without clear 
justification “caught [the Monroe Administration] in a diplomatic 
bind,” and the cabinet was sharply divided on the appropriate 
response.51  Behind closed doors, Jackson’s only staunch defender 
was the Secretary of State, who saw the dislocation caused by the 
invasion as an opportunity to gain leverage in his negotiations 
with Spain over the final disposition of Florida.  For these 
unrelated political reasons, Adams therefore urged the President to 
defend the invasion as an act of preemptive self-defense and the 
executions as legitimate acts of retributive justice.52 
In contrast, Secretary of War John C. Calhoun, with the 
concurrence of the Attorney General and the Secretary of the 
Treasury, argued that Jackson had waged an undeclared war 
against a nation in amity with the United States, in violation of 
Calhoun’s explicit orders.53  For that reason, they “secretly urged 
[Jackson’s] censure and roundly called for an investigation.”54 
In July 1818, after procrastinating for more than a month, 
President Monroe ultimately decided against issuing a public 
censure, largely because he “was loath to own up to his share in 
Jackson’s aggression,” going so far as to suggest that several 
 
51 ANDREW BURSTEIN, THE PASSIONS OF ANDREW JACKSON 131 (2003). 
52 Adams did indeed take advantage of the situation to promptly negotiate a 
treaty with his Spanish counterpart, Don Luis de Onís, “acquiring the whole of 
Florida for the United States and mapping the long border between Spanish and 
American possessions extending all the way to the Pacific.”  Id. at 132–33; see also 
Deborah A. Rosen, Wartime Prisoners and the Rule of Law: Andrew Jackson’s Military 
Tribunals during the First Seminole War, 28 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 559, 589 (2008) 
(explaining senators’ unwillingness to discuss censuring Jackson’s behavior in 
Florida while the Adams-Onís Transcontinental Treaty was pending, because 
many Americans credited Jackson with creating the diplomatic environment in 
which the treaty was negotiated).   
53 See infra text accompanying notes 99–100. 
54 BURSTEIN, supra note 51, at 132; see also 1 ROBERT V. REMINI, ANDREW 
JACKSON: THE COURSE OF AMERICAN EMPIRE, 1767-1821 366-67 (2d ed. 1998) 
(“Calhoun [was] furious because Jackson . . . had gone over his head to Monroe 
for authorization to seize Florida . . . .”). 
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incriminating letters Jackson had written from the battlefield 
should be doctored, supposedly in the interests of national 
security.55  Although he secretly drafted a critical note that was 
evidently meant to mollify the Spanish foreign minister and 
promised to return Pensacola and St. Marks, the President was 
reluctant to adopt a more confrontational strategy with Jackson, 
because he feared that it might prove politically unpopular given 
Jackson’s growing status as a cult hero.56  Moreover, as he said in a 
confidential letter to Senator Rufus King, if he “disavow[ed] 
[Jackson’s] measures [and brought] the General to trial,” it might 
interfere with “the cession of Florida . . . . Spain must see by this 
occurrence . . . that she cannot retain Florida.”57  Accordingly, 
President Monroe’s decision to mount a public defense of his 
conduct was hardly a matter of principle and therefore lends little 
if any weight to the precedential value of the case. 
Instead, by any reasonable measure, as Rep. Charles Mercer 
remarked during the congressional debates over Jackson’s censure, 
the trial and execution of Arbuthnot and Ambrister is nothing less 
than “a stain on the records of the judicial proceedings of this 
nation.”58  Given that this is the only known instance of a military 
 
55 BURSTEIN, supra note 51, at 133; REMINI, supra note 54, at 368.  After 
reviewing one particularly incriminating letter, Monroe cryptically wrote in the 
margin that he hoped Jackson’s “conduct will be approved, which shows, that he 
had acted on his own responsibility.”  DAVID S. HEIDLER & JEANNE T. HEIDLER, OLD 
HICKORY’S WAR: ANDREW JACKSON AND THE QUEST FOR EMPIRE 181 (2d ed. 2003) 
(quoting Letter from Andrew Jackson to James Monroe, President of the United 
States, (June 2, 1818) (on file with the New York Public Library)).   
56 See, e.g., REMINI, supra note 54, at 366–67.  
In April and May 1818, the newspapers were filled with stories of the 
capture of St. Marks and the executions of Arbuthnot and Ambrister, 
which delighted a large segment of the American public. . . .  Obviously 
the President could not censure Jackson because . . . it might not sit well 
with the American people. 
Id.; David S. Heidler, The Politics of National Aggression: Congress and the First 
Seminole War, 13 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 501, 507 (1993) (footnotes omitted) (“Anyone 
who doubted Jackson’s popularity or challenged his power did so at high peril.  
Monroe had spent a good deal of time mollifying Jackson’s prickly sensitivity 
over a variety of concerns and often did so at the expense of the principle of 
civilian control of the military.”). 
57 Letter from James Monroe to R. King (July 22, 1818), in 6 THE LIFE AND 
CORRESPONDENCE OF RUFUS KING, 1816–1827, at 155, 156 (Charles R. King ed., 
1900). 
58 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 818–19 (1819). 
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prosecution of a non-resident alien for conduct that resembles 
providing material support to the enemy, it is important to correct 
the Government’s tendentious account of the matter.  Before 
turning to the myriad legal infirmities that infected the court 
martial proceedings, however, it is appropriate to pause for a 
moment to consider the unseemly historical background of the 
case. 
In the judgment of historians who have studied the First 
Seminole War, it is a “distortion simply to say that fugitive 
Negroes and hostile Indians stirred up by unscrupulous British 
subjects were making unprovoked attacks on innocent American 
frontiersmen,”59 as the Monroe Administration belatedly claimed.  
On the contrary, the conflict that ensnared Arbuthnot and 
Ambrister was essentially a war of aggression waged by the 
United States against the sovereign territory of Spain, primarily at 
the instigation of American slave-holding interests.  In the early 
nineteenth century, what is today Florida was a largely 
undeveloped frontier:  “a wild borderland where Indian tribes, the 
United States, Spain, and Great Britain competed fiercely for 
supremacy.”60  After the War of 1812, it remained under the 
nominal control of Spain, but Spanish authorities were unable to 
“enforce peace on the border,” and perhaps more importantly, 
“were unable to prevent black slaves from fleeing to Florida and 
joining the Seminole Indians.”61 
In fact, more than 1,000 black persons—including former slaves 
who had escaped from captivity in the United States and their 
offspring—lived peacefully among the closely-related indigenous 
tribes known collectively as the Seminoles, in a series of villages in 
Spanish Florida.  The American plantation owners living in the 
neighboring states greatly resented this development, both because 
they considered the escaped slaves to be their chattel property, and 
because the existence of thriving communities of people of color in 
such close proximity to themselves was considered an existential 
threat to their “peculiar” way of life.  While the motivation for the 
invasion of Florida was thus partly inspired by the desire for 
 
59 J. Leitch Wright, Jr., A Note on the First Seminole War as Seen by the Indians, 
Negroes, and Their British Advisers, 34 J. S. HIST. 565, 574 (1968). 
60 John K. Mahon, The First Seminole War, November 21, 1817–May 24, 1818, 77 
FLA. HIST. Q. 62, 62 (1998). 
61 Id. 
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territorial expansion which necessitated the forcible removal of the 
indigenous inhabitants, the “principal objective was to break up 
the free Negro frontier settlements which were becoming 
increasingly a menace to the slave systems of adjacent states.”62  It 
bears emphasizing that these were the “savage communities” to 
which President Monroe was principally referring in the State of 
the Union speech which the Government cites in justification of the 
execution of Arbuthnot and Ambrister.63 
The prologue to the war occurred in July 1816, when Jackson, 
under pressure from frontier citizens, ordered the destruction of 
the so-called Negro Fort, which was home to more than 300 black 
men, women, and children.64  The fort, its surrounding fields, and 
pasture land, which extended fifty miles along the Apalachicola 
River, had become “a beacon light to restless slaves for miles 
around” and its mere existence was considered “an unceasing 
threat to the property rights of the slave-owners along the border 
and as such its abatement was demanded.”65  Although the 
garrison itself was located some sixty miles within Spanish 
territory, Jackson rationalized the incursion as an act of national 
self-defense since as he informed the Governor of Pensacola, the 
Spanish authorities had failed to, “return to our citizens . . . those 
 
62 Kenneth Wiggins Porter, Negroes and the Seminole War, 1817–1818, 36 J. 
NEGRO HIST. 249, 280 (1951).  See also Heidler, supra note 56, at 504 (“Americans 
interpreted [Indian land] claims as open hostility, especially when Seminoles 
began providing a refuge for runaway slaves.”); Linda K. Kerber, The Abolitionist 
Perception of the Indian, 62 J. AM. HIST. 271, 275 (1975) (“Because the raids had 
begun as retribution for the harboring of runaway slaves, the debate also became 
one on slavery and the extent to which the national government was responsible 
for its protection.”); Mahon, supra note 60, at 62 (“Slaveholders considered [a 
garrison of black troops substantially made up of “runaway slaves” as] renegades 
and . . . a menace to their lives and property.”); Rosen, supra note 52, at 562–63 
(“Jackson invaded Florida with the stated goal of stopping the ongoing border 
conflict with the Indians, but with the additional underlying objectives of ousting 
the Spanish from Florida and ending the territory’s role as a sanctuary for fugitive 
slaves.”). 
63 See supra text accompanying note 48 (quoting President Monroe’s 1819 
State of the Union Address in which he referred to “savage communities”).  In this 
sense, the First Seminole War might fairly be characterized as the opening act in 
the conflict that ultimately culminated in the Civil War. 
64 See Porter, supra note 62, at 260–61 (describing the inhabitants of the 
garrison at the “Negro Fort” as “[s]omething over 300 Negroes, including women 
and children, together with about 20 renegade Choctaw and a few Seminole 
warriors . . . .”).   
65 Id. at 261.   
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negroes now in [the] fort” who had been “stolen and enticed” from 
“the service of their masters.”66  In his orders to General Edmund 
Gaines, Jackson said that he harbored “little doubt . . . that this fort 
has been established by some villains for the purpose of rapine and 
plunder, and that it ought to be blown up, regardless of the ground 
on which it stands.”67  “[D]estroy it,” he emphatically concluded, 
“and return the stolen negroes and property to their rightful 
owners.”68 
Nothing could have been further from the truth.  As Jackson 
was well aware, the fort originally had been built by the British 
Army in 1814.69  When the British pulled their forces out of Florida 
the following summer, they left the garrison and its armaments in 
the custody of fugitive slaves, who had been recruited with the 
promise of freedom and land in exchange for their service to the 
British Government.70  As Joshua Giddings, a prominent 
abolitionist politician from Ohio, observed with the perspective of 
forty years: 
Perhaps no portion of our national history exhibits such 
disregard of international law, as this unprovoked invasion 
of Florida.  For thirty years, the slaves of our Southern 
 
66 See Letter from General Jackson to the Governor of Pensacola, 23 April 
1816, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS 4:555–56 (Walter Lowrie & 
Walter S. Franklin eds., 1834) (instructing Governor Zuniga, as the authority of 
Spanish Florida, to take action against the Fort, or expect U.S. forces to cross the 
border and destroy the settlement in order to defend U.S. citizens’ property 
rights). 
67 JOSHUA R. GIDDINGS, THE EXILES OF FLORIDA 37 (1858) (quoting Jackson’s 
order to General Gaines). 
68 Id.; see also Letter from General Jackson to the Secretary of War, 15 June 
1816, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS 4:557 (“[T]here can be no fear of 
disturbing the good understanding that exists between us and Spain, by 
destroying the negro fort, and restoring to the owners the negroes that may be 
captured.  The 4th and 7th infantry will be sufficient to destroy it.”). 
69 See, e.g., Report of Captain Amelung to General Jackson, 4 June 1816, 
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS 4:557 (providing General Jackson 
intelligence on the fort, including that it was constructed by “Nichols and 
Woodbine” of the British army).  
70 See Wright, supra note 59, at 569 (stating that black soldiers who served 
under the British at the fort were promised freedom as well as land and that most 
remained living at the fort or in nearby settlements); see also Porter, supra note 62, 
at 260 (noting that after the British forces left the fort they relinquished their 
armaments to refugee slaves who had been recruited by the promise of freedom at 
war’s end). 
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States have been in the habit of fleeing to the British 
Provinces.  Here they are admitted to all the rights of 
citizenship, in the same manner as they were in Florida.  
They vote and hold office under British laws; and when our 
Government demanded that the English Ministry should 
disregard the rights of these people and return them to 
slavery, the British Minister contemptuously refused even 
to hold correspondence with our Secretary of State on a 
subject so abhorrent to every principle of national law and 
self-respect.  Our Government coolly submitted to the 
scornful arrogance of England; but did not hesitate to 
invade Florida with an armed force, and to seize faithful 
subjects of Spain, and enslave them.71 
Moreover, the allegation that the Black Seminole population of 
Spanish Florida was a genuine military threat to the United States 
was a sheer pretext for aggression.  It is true, of course, that the 
Seminoles and their black allies aggressively defended themselves 
against the encroachments of white settlers and bounty-hunters 
searching for escaped slaves.  The Indians, however, ineffectually 
pressed claims for the return of lands that they believed were 
rightfully theirs.72  As a result, periodic outbursts of violence, 
followed by the inevitable cycle of reprisal and counter-reprisal, 
were endemic in the Apalachicola River region.73 
 
71 GIDDINGS, supra note 67, at 37 n.1. 
72 See, e.g., Porter, supra note 62, at 255 (observing that “to the numerous free 
Negroes and the runaways living among the Indians [annexation] meant the loss 
of hard-won freedom”).  Wright, supra note 59, at 565 (“There is no doubt . . . that 
[the Seminoles] considered that part of their lands lay in the United States above 
the Florida boundary, that the Americans were the aggressors, and that, rather 
than making unprovoked attacks, the Indians were merely defending their 
homeland.”) (footnote omitted). 
73 David Mitchell was a respected former Governor of Georgia, who served 
as the official U.S. envoy to the Indians in the region during this period.  During 
the Senate investigation into Jackson’s conduct of the war, Mitchell testified that, 
in his experience:  
The peace of the frontier of Georgia has always been exposed and 
disturbed, more or less, by acts of violence, committed as well by the 
whites as the Indians; and a spirit of retaliation has mutually prevailed . . 
. .  I believe the first outrage committed on the frontier of Georgia, after 
the treaty of Fort Jackson, was by these [white] banditti, who plundered 
a party of Seminole Indians, on their way to Georgia for the purpose of 
trade, and killed one of them.  This produced retaliation on the part of 
the Indians.   
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But the notion that the Black Seminoles were preparing to 
launch a campaign of “rapine and plunder” against the white 
citizenry of Georgia or Alabama was preposterous.  Quite the 
opposite, as one disinterested observer reported, the prospect of 
facing Jackson’s army left the native population “terrified, not 
hostile.”74  While it amounted to little more than thinly-veiled 
racist demagoguery, the accusation nevertheless became part of the 
standard repertoire of Jackson’s partisan defenders.  As one ardent 
congressional supporter put it, Ambrister’s execution had been 
justified because he supposedly “came to Florida to command the 
runaway negroes of Georgia, slaves who had absconded from their 
masters, and were organized by him to return to our country, and 
visit it with all the horrors of a savage negro war.”75 
In any event, Jackson’s forces quite literally blew up Negro Fort 
by deliberately firing a cannon ball into the fort’s ammunition 
depot.  Some 270 men, women, and children were killed in the 
explosion and the ensuing battle.  The Americans reportedly took 
64 prisoners, including two men who were identified as the 
resident Negro and Choctaw chiefs.  In a nascent version of 
extraordinary rendition, they were turned over to friendly Creek 
Indians who had been recruited to fight alongside the U.S. Army.  
The two men were immediately executed in retaliation for the 
death of an American prisoner, although not before the Choctaw 
chief was scalped alive.76 
 
Sworn statement of D. B. Mitchell, 23 February 1819, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: 
MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:748–49 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Claire Clarke eds., 
1832).  See also HEIDLER & HEIDLER, supra note 55, at 79–80 (detailing David 
Mitchell’s appointment as the U.S. agent to the Creek Indian tribe under President 
Madison). 
74  HEIDLER & HEIDLER, supra note 55, at 123. 
75 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 1039 (1819).  In 1830, then-President Jackson rewarded 
Representative Henry Baldwin’s loyalty with an appointment to the Supreme 
Court where he earned “the dubious distinction of being the first Supreme Court 
Justice to expound the principle of substantive due process—to protect slave-
owners against possible congressional action.”  Donald M. Roper, Judicial 
Unanimity and the Marshall Court—A Road to Reappraisal, 9 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 
131 (1965).  See also Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. 449, 510–17 (1841) (Baldwin, J., 
concurring) (stating that for the federal scheme of government to work, slaves 
must be considered nothing more than legal property). 
76 See Letter from General Jackson to the Governor of Pensacola, 23 April 
1816, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS 4:555 (urging that the “negro 
fort” needed to be subdued because it posed a threat to peaceful diplomatic 
relations between the United States and Spain); GIDDINGS, supra note 67, at 41–42 
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The few remaining prisoners who survived their wounds were 
returned to Georgia and sold into slavery, thereby fulfilling 
Jackson’s charge.  In most cases, it was impossible to establish who 
had a valid claim of ownership to these persons, considering there 
was no reliable “proof of identity, nor was there any court 
authorized to take testimony, or enter decree in such case.”77  In 
order to clear any cloud over the title, the survivors “were 
delivered over upon claim, taken to the interior, and sold to 
different planters” where they were “swallowed up” in the mass of 
African-Americans being held in slavery.78 
The atrocity at Negro Fort effectively ended the presence of 
free blacks in the Apalachicola River region, with approximately 
one-third of the entire population living in Spanish Florida having 
been either killed or enslaved.  The survivors of the Negro Fort 
settlement who managed to escape the massacre fled east to the 
Suwanee River.  There, they found refuge with another branch of 
the Seminole moieties living under the protection of Chief 
Bowlegs.79  In early 1817, Alexander Arbuthnot, a seventy year-old 
Scottish merchant, arrived at the Seminole settlement on the 
Suwanee in his schooner Chance.  Having obtained a license from 
the Spanish governor of Cuba, Arbuthnot had loaded his vessel 
with merchandise and set off for Indian country with the intention 
of establishing a trading-house.80  Although he was undoubtedly a 
shrewd businessman in search of profits, he also took a genuine 
interest in the welfare of the Seminoles.  As such, he “frequently 
wrote on . . . Bowlegs’s behalf to American officers and officials,” 
 
(describing the massacre at the fort and the execution of the Negro and Choctaw 
chiefs); Porter, supra note 62, at 264 (stating that the Negro and Choctaw chiefs 
were executed in retaliation for an American prisoner’s death).  In exchange for 
assisting in the attack, the Creeks were promised booty seized at Negro Fort, as 
well as a bounty of $50 for each American-owned slave they captured.  KENNETH 
W. PORTER, THE BLACK SEMINOLES: HISTORY OF A FREEDOM-SEEKING PEOPLE 17 
(Alcione M. Amos & Thomas P. Senter eds., 1996). 
77 GIDDINGS, supra note 67, at 42. 
78 Id. 
79 See Porter, supra note 62, at 264–65 (explaining that those who were able to 
escape the massacre at the Negro Fort settlement fled to Bowlegs’s villages on the 
Suwanee).  
80 See id. at 266 (detailing Arbuthnot’s 1817 arrival to Suwanee in order to 
establish a trading-house); Wright, supra note 59, at 573 (noting that by 1817, 
Arbuthnot had established stores along the Suwanee river with the approval of 
the Spanish governor of Cuba). 
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urging the return of territory which they felt had been taken by the 
United States in violation of its treaty obligations.  Arbuthnot’s 
letters “were later remembered and held against him.”81 
Several months later, Arbuthnot’s schooner returned to the 
Suwanee settlement from a trip to the West Indies with a number 
of white passengers.  Among them was a young Robert Ambrister, 
who had recently lost his commission in the British Royal Marines 
reportedly for engaging in an illegal duel, the scion of a prominent 
Bahamian family.82  In need of employment, Ambrister had 
accepted the invitation of his former captain, George Woodbine, 
who had trained pro-British Indians and fugitive slaves to fight the 
Americans in a previous conflict, to return to Florida.83  Now 
soldiers of fortune, the purpose of their mission was frankly 
paramilitary; namely, to “work[] with Indians and blacks to drive 
the Spanish out of Florida.”84 
Although Woodbine soon left, Ambrister decided to remain.  
According to the testimony at his court martial, he reportedly said 
that he intended “to see the Negroes righted” and encouraged 
them not to retreat before the advancing Americans “for, if they 
ran any further [sic], they would be driven into the sea.”85  Given 
his military experience, he thus took over the task of “drilling . . . 
the Negro warriors” as well as acting as a counselor to Chief 
Bowlegs.86  It was for these actions, rather than any actual war 
 
81 Porter, supra note 62, at 266–67.  See Rosen, supra note 52, at 561 (“In 
Florida, Arbuthnot served as an advocate for the restoration of Creek lands in 
Alabama and Georgia, which they had ceded to the United States.”). 
82 See HEIDLER & HEIDLER, supra note 55, at 151–52 (summarizing Ambrister’s 
Bahamian heritage and the rumor that he lost his commission with the British 
Royal Marines due to an illegal duel); PORTER, supra note 76, at 18 (identifying the 
two white men Arbuthnot returned from the West Indies with as British Captain 
Woodbine and Robert C. Ambrister).  Ambrister’s father was a successful 
merchant and the Secretary of the Bahamian legislature, while his uncle was the 
Provincial Governor.  See Frank L. Owsley, Jr., Ambrister and Arbuthnot: 
Adventurers or Martyrs for British Honor, 5 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 289, 299, 305 (1985) 
(providing background on Arbuthnot and Ambrister’s executions). 
83 See Owsley, supra note 82, at 296–98 (detailing Woodbine’s history as a 
British agent and recruiter of pro-British Indians and slaves in Florida). 
84 Rosen, supra note 52, at 562; see also Owsley, supra note 82, at 305 
(“Although Jackson was certain that Ambrister’s expedition was aimed at the 
United States, it was in fact directed at the Spanish in Florida.”). 
85 28 April 1818, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:732. 
86 Porter, supra note 62, at 267. 
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crimes, that Arbuthnot and Ambrister would incur the wrath of 
Old Hickory. 
Meanwhile, the Fort Negro massacre dramatically ratcheted up 
the level of tension between the parties, making the outbreak of 
further violence almost inevitable.  Lest there be any doubt about 
the Americans’ motives, in August 1817, General Gaines sent a 
letter to Kenhadjo, the chief of the largest of the Seminole bands, 
whose settlement stretched for several miles on the shore of Lake 
Miccosukee, near present-day Tallahassee.87  After complaining 
that the Seminoles were “bad people” who had “murdered many 
of my people, and stolen my cattle and many good horses,”88 
Gaines finally got to the point of his missive:  “You harbor a great 
many of my black people among you at Sahwahnee,” he wrote, 
“[i]f you give me leave to go by you against them, I shall not hurt 
any thing belonging to you.”89  In response, the chief curtly rejected 
this “olive branch”: 
You charge me with killing your people, stealing your 
cattle, and burning your houses; it is I that have cause to 
complain of the Americans . . . .  I harbor no negros.  When 
the Englishmen were at war with America, some took 
shelter among them; and it is for you white people to settle 
those things among yourselves . . . .  I shall use force to stop 
any armed Americans from passing my towns or my 
lands.90 
As Kenneth Porter has observed:  “[a] U.S. general had 
demanded, from a Seminole chief, the right to go slave hunting in 
Spanish territory and been refused.  Kenhadjo, previously 
uninvolved in the hostilities surrounding him, was now an 
enemy.”91  As they would soon learn, the Miccosukee band would 
pay a heavy price for their chief’s defiance. 
 
87 See id. (describing the letter that General Gaines sent Chief Kenhadjo on 
August 1817); see also HEIDLER & HEIDLER, supra note 55, at 39, 99 (detailing the 
content of the letter General Gaines sent to Kenhadjo in August of 1817). 
88 Letter from General Gaines to the Seminole Chief, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: 
MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:723. 
89 Id.  
90 Letter from King Hatchy to General Gaines, In Answer to the Foregoing, 
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:723. 
91 PORTER, supra note 76, at 19; see also HEIDLER & HEIDLER, supra note 55, at 99–
100. 
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The immediate casus belli was a bloody incident that occurred 
at Fowltown, a small Seminole village, which had been a persistent 
source of tension because it sat on land claimed by white settlers 
under the Treaty of Fort Jackson, on the Flint River just north of the 
Florida border.92  In November 1817, a detachment of U.S. soldiers 
from nearby Fort Scott crossed the river to the Seminole side to 
gather wood.  In response, the chief of Fowltown, Neamathla, 
informed General Gaines in no uncertain terms “not to cross or cut 
a stick of wood on the east side of Flint River, alleging that the land 
was his . . . [and] that he was directed . . . to protect and defend it, 
and should do so.”93 
Such a challenge would prove “irresistible to an American 
frontier commander,” and Gaines demanded a meeting with 
Neamathla to resolve the matter.94  The chief refused the general’s 
invitation, and Gaines promptly sent a detachment of 250 soldiers 
to retrieve him and his warriors, albeit with instructions that “in 
the event of resistance . . . treat them as enemies.”95  Inevitably, in 
defense of their village, the Seminoles fired on the approaching 
troops, who proceeded to kill an unknown number of warriors, 
drive the survivors into the swamps, and then plunder the village 
and burn it to the ground.  As Gaines explained the incident in a 
report to his superiors, he claimed he was a reasonable and peace-
loving man, but “[t]he poisonous cup of barbarism cannot be taken 
from the lips of the savage by the mild voice of reason alone; the 
strong mandate of justice must be resorted to and enforced.”96 
 
92 See PORTER, supra note 76, at 19 (attributing the outbreak of the First 
Seminole War to the clash at Fowltown); see also REMINI, supra note 54, at 345 
(noting that the Seminoles “did not want war” with the U.S. at the time). 
93 Extract of a Letter from General Gaines to Major General Andrew Jackson, 
21 November 1817, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:686. 
94 REMINI, supra note 54, at 346; see also HEIDLER & HEIDLER, supra note 55, at 
100 (explaining that Fowlton would be an “easy” target for the U.S. Army and 
that General Gaines had concluded that “the only recourse [against the Indians 
there] was force”). 
95 Extract of a Letter from General Gaines to Major General Andrew Jackson, 
21 November 1817, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:686; see also 
HEIDLER & HEIDLER, supra note 55, at 104 (explaining that after Neumathla 
declined General Gaines’s invitation to meet, Gaines mobilized 250 men to 
Fowlton). 
96 Extract of a letter from General Gaines to the Secretary of War, 4 December 
1817, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:688. 
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It is generally agreed that the First Seminole War began in 
earnest with the unprovoked destruction of Fowltown.97  The 
Seminoles wasted no time in exacting revenge.  Nine days later, a 
large open boat was slowly moving up the Apalachicola River 
toward Fort Scott carrying forty soldiers, most of whom were sick, 
as well as seven women and four children.  Lying in wait, the 
Seminoles ambushed the boat when it drifted close to the shoreline 
and killed everyone on board with the exception of one woman 
who was taken hostage and four soldiers who managed to 
escape.98  On December 16, after news of the bloodbath reached 
Washington, D.C., Calhoun authorized Gaines to “consider 
[him]self at liberty to march across the Florida line and to attack 
[the Seminoles] within its limits, should it be found necessary, 
unless they should shelter themselves under a Spanish post.  In the 
last event, [he was to] immediately notify [the War] Department.”99  
Ten days later, Calhoun ordered Jackson to take over command of 
the campaign at Fort Scott and “to adopt the necessary measures to 
terminate [the] conflict” with the Seminoles.100 
When the ground invasion began the following spring, 
Jackson’s principal targets were the Black Seminole villages on the 
Suwanee River.  But other than a few skirmishes along the way, his 
army of some 3,300 men encountered remarkably little armed 
 
97 According to David Mitchell, “General Gaines . . . sent for the chief of 
Fowltown, and for his contumacy in not immediately appearing before [sic] him, 
the town was attacked and destroyed by the [sic] troops of the United States, by 
order of General Gaines.  This fact was, I conceive, the immediate cause of the 
Seminole war.”  No. 16, 23 February 1819, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY 
AFFAIRS 1:749. 
98 See HEIDLER & HEIDLER, supra note 55, at 105, 107 (describing the passengers 
and the ensuing ambush); Porter, supra note 62, at 268–69 (detailing the Indians’ 
and Negros’ ambush and slaughter of U.S. troops, women, and children on board 
a boat traveling up the Apalachicola river); see also REMINI, supra note 54, at 346. 
99 Letter of J.C. Calhoun, 16 December 1817, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: 
MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:689. 
100 Letter of J.C. Calhoun, 26 December 1817, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: 
MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:690.  The newly-minted Secretary of War assumed, naively 
perhaps, that his instructions to Jackson did not rescind the previous limitation on 
taking possession of Spanish territory without prior Department approval.  
Although well aware of Gaines’s orders, Jackson was determined to seize Florida 
anyway, and made his intentions clear in a letter to President Monroe several 
weeks later, to which the President never responded.  4 THE PAPERS OF ANDREW 
JACKSON 1816–1820, 166–67 (Harold D. Moser et al. eds., 1994); see also HEIDLER & 
HEIDLER, supra note 55, at 117–21 (discussing the history and implication of 
“Calhoun’s 26 Decemeber 1817 order to Jackson”).  
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resistance, which arguably undermines any claim that the offensive 
had been justified as an act of preemptive self-defense.  On April 1, 
Jackson’s campaign began by destroying the Miccosukee 
settlement, apparently in retaliation for Kenhadjo’s refusal to 
permit the Americans to traverse his territory in search of fugitive 
slaves.  During the battle, one American soldier was killed and 
several were wounded.  Although definitive casualty figures for 
the Seminoles are not known, Jackson reported to his superiors 
with apparent satisfaction “that his forces had burned 300 houses 
and made off with ample corn and cattle.”101 
A week later, he notified the Spanish commander of St. Marks 
with some rhetorical license that he had been ordered by the 
President to “chastise a savage foe who combined with a lawless 
band of Negro brigands, have for some time past been carrying on 
a cruel and unprovoked war against the citizens of the United 
States . . . .  [T]he next day, he occupied St. Marks without a 
fight.”102  The next day, he occupied St. Marks without resistance.  
There were no Negro “brigands” or Indian “savages” anywhere in 
sight, but Jackson did find Arbuthnot huddled in the Governor’s 
quarters and captured him.103  His men also managed to capture 
two Seminole chieftains, Imala Micco and Prophet Francis, who 
had been lured aboard an American naval vessel in the harbor that 
was falsely flying a British flag.  While the white European was 
afforded the courtesy of a trial before being executed, Jackson 
spitefully ordered the Indians to be “hung without trial, and with 
little ceremony.”104 
 
101 Mahon, supra note 60, at 65.  As David and Jeanne Heidler point out, the:  
Miccosukee Seminoles did not want war, and they sent talks to Gaines 
stating it.  They only wanted whites to stop stealing their cattle and 
killing their people . . . .  The headmen were old men, tired of running 
and wary of fighting, fearful of losing everything and destroying their 
people.   
HEIDLER & HEIDLER, supra note 55, at 99.  The Miccosukee settlement thus does not 
appear to have been a legitimate military target. 
102 Mahon, supra note 60, at 65. 
103 See Owsley, supra note 82, at 293–94 (noting that Arbuthnot was captured 
inside the governor’s quarters at St. Marks). 
104 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 261 (1819).  See also Porter, supra note 62, at 270 
(stating that “Jackson had the chiefs summarily hanged”); Mahon, supra note 60, 
at 65–66 (noting that the Indians captured were executed without a trial while 
Arbuthnot was court-martialed). 
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The irony is that earlier in the conflict, warriors under the 
leadership of Prophet Francis had captured Duncan McKrimmon, 
a young soldier in the Georgia militia, and condemned him to 
death in reprisal for the Americans’ killing of Indian civilians.  
While they were preparing to carry out the execution, the chief’s 
oldest daughter, Milly, interceded for the terrified soldier’s life, 
apparently out of a sheer sense of compassion.  The warriors 
relented with the chief’s blessing, and not only didn’t kill the man, 
but eventually ransomed him to the Spaniards for several gallons 
of rum.  After the war, McKrimmon was so grateful to Milly for 
saving his life that he brought her a modest gift of money he had 
collected from the citizens of his home town and offered to marry 
her, although she politely declined.105  Savagery, it seems, is in the 
eye of the beholder.106 
Jackson then turned his attention to Bowleg’s Town, the largest 
of the settlements under the leadership of Chief Bowlegs, which 
was about 100 miles away on the Suwanee River.  He reached the 
town on April 16, where after a brief engagement, the majority of 
the Seminoles and black settlers broke into small groups and 
disappeared into the woods.  Frustrated at his inability to engage 
the enemy, Jackson ordered the town to be looted and destroyed; 
his forces suffered no causalities.107  While Jackson’s men were 
busy plundering the town for food and cattle, Ambrister 
 
105 See 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 753 (1819) (summarizing Milly’s intervention on 
behalf of the condemned McKrimmon to save him from execution); HEIDLER & 
HEIDLER, supra note 55, at 138–39 (chronicling the history and meeting between 
McKrimmon and Milly); T. Frederick Davis, Milly Francis and Duncan McKrimmon: 
An Authentic Florida Pocahontas, 21 FLA. HIST. Q. 254, 256–60 (1943) (detailing 
Milly’s intervention to prevent the execution of McKrimmon, as well as his 
subsequent gift of gratitude and offer of marriage). 
106 The story of McKrimmon’s reprieve was recounted by Representative 
Henry Storrs during the debate over Jackson’s censure.  To his credit, Storrs 
included Jackson’s execution of the Indians in his indictment of the general’s 
actions.  “We profess to be the only free Government on earth[,]” Storrs said in his 
floor speech, “that our intercourse with foreign nations is characterized by 
moderation and justice . . . that our national character is beyond reproach . . . .  Let 
our vote, on this occasion, wash out the stains which have tarnished our 
reputation by the execution of the Indian chiefs and the death of Arbuthnot and 
Ambrister.  If, however, these deeds of cruelty are to receive the sanction of this 
House, here, before God and man, I wash my hands of their blood.”  33 ANNALS 
OF CONG. 753–54 (1819). 
107 See Mahon, supra note 60, at 65–66 (describing Jackson’s assault on 
Bowlegs Town); see also Porter, supra note 62, at 273–75 (pointing out that in the 
destruction of Bowlegs Town, Jackson’s men suffered no casualties). 
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“blundered into the camp at midnight on [his] way back to 
Suwanee, not having heard of its capture” and was promptly taken 
into custody.108 
5. THE TRIAL AND EXECUTION OF  
ARBUTHNOT AND AMBRISTER 
 Although Jackson’s troops would go on to occupy Pensacola, 
again without firing a shot in anger, the active phase of military 
operations in the First Seminole War was at an end.  Jackson 
returned to St. Marks with Ambrister in tow, and informed 
Calhoun that he would be leaving for his home in Tennessee since 
his continued “presence in this country can be no longer 
necessary.”109  But first he had to take care of some unfinished 
business.  On April 26, he convened what was styled a “special 
court-martial” comprised of a panel of 12 Army officers, with 
General Gaines serving as the presiding officer, to hear the charges 
and specifications against the defendants. 
The outcome was largely a foregone conclusion.  As Jackson 
had informed Calhoun when Arbuthnot was apprehended several 
weeks earlier, the elderly Scot was “suspected as an instigator of 
this savage war” and would be held “in confinement, until 
evidences of his guilt can be collected.”110  When a cache of his 
letters was found on board his schooner, Jackson had all the 
evidence he needed, even if their contents did not logically support 
the theory that Arbuthnot deliberately incited the Seminoles to 
engage in an unlawful belligerency.111  Not wanting to leave 
 
108 Porter, supra note 62, at 276; see also Owsley, supra note 82, at 303 
(describing the circumstances of Ambrister’s arrest by Jackson’s forces). 
109 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 261 (1819); see also REMINI, supra note 54, at 356–57 
(“As far as [Jackson] could tell the war against the Seminoles was over.  No 
appreciable hostile force appeared to do battle.  Indians simply vanished . . . 
whenever he appeared.  Obviously they could not wage war and probably had 
never been prepared for one in the first place.”). 
110 Letter from General Jackson to Secretary of War John C. Calhoun, 8 April 
1818, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:699–700. 
111 The Seminoles’ strategic decision to retreat at Suwanee was informed by 
Arbuthnot’s warning that resistance to Jackson’s forces would be futile.  On April 
2, 1818, word of Jackson’s invasion had reached Arbuthnot at St. Marks, and he 
immediately wrote a letter to his son.  See Letter from A. Arbuthnot to his son, 
John Arbuthnot, 2 April 1818, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:722.  
“The main drift of the Americans,” he pointed out, “is to destroy the black 
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anything to chance, five of the members Jackson chose to serve on 
the panel “were Volunteer officers whom [he] had personally 
recruited for the campaign.”112  The proceedings then moved with 
breathtaking alacrity; over the course of the next seventy-two hours, 
the defendants were formally charged, tried, convicted, and 
executed.113 
The only glitch occurred with respect to the sentence given to 
Ambrister, who chose to throw himself on the mercy of the court 
rather than contest the validity of the charges.  The panel had 
initially sentenced both men to death but, upon reconsideration, 
reduced Ambrister’s sentence to fifty lashes and one year’s 
confinement at hard labor, whereupon “the court adjourned sine 
die.”114  Never a stickler for legal formalities, Jackson was not 
inclined to let a mere verdict stand in the way of exacting 
vengeance.  As such, he presumed as the convening authority to 
approve the findings and sentence with respect to Arbuthnot, but 
“disapprove[d] the reconsideration of the sentence” given to 
 
population of Suwany.  Tell my friend Bowleck that it is throwing away his 
people to attempt to resist such a powerful force . . . .”  Id.  While this letter was 
introduced by the prosecution in an unsuccessful attempt to prove that Arbuthnot 
was guilty of being a spy, it plainly undermines the notion he instigated the 
Indians to engage in hostilities, lawful or otherwise, against the United States.  As 
Arbuthnot said in his closing argument, “[n]othing . . . of an inflammatory nature 
can be found on reading the document . . . authorizing the opinion that I was 
prompting the Indians to war.”  See Defence (K.) of A. Arbuthnot, 26 April 1818, 
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:730.  If anything, he did precisely the 
opposite.  Given the illogic of the charge, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that 
Jackson’s animosity toward Arbuthnot was motivated, at least in part, by his 
belief that Arbuthnot’s warning had deprived him of the opportunity to inflict 
greater casualties at Suwanee.  See REMINI, supra note 54, at 356 (noting Jackson’s 
intention to execute Arbuthnot and Ambrister after discovering that the two men 
warned the Seminoles when Jackson’s army was approaching); see also Letter from 
General Jackson to Governor of Pensacola Don Jose Masot, 23 May 1818, 
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:712–13 (providing an account of the 
battle for Suwanee and the limited number of casualties inflicted by Jackson’s 
army). 
112 HEIDLER &HEIDLER, supra note 55, at 153.   
113 See, e.g., Robert Butler, Adjutant General, Head-Quarters Division of the 
South, General Orders, 29 April 1818, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 
1:734 (promulgating order of Maj. Gen. Jackson approving the conviction and 
death sentence of Arbuthnot and Ambrister, respectively, following “a special 
court-martial, commenced on the 26th instant at St. Marks, and continued until 
the night of the 28th”).  
114 Id. 
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Ambrister and reimposed the death penalty.115  Shortly thereafter, 
Arbuthnot was hanged from the yardarm of his schooner, while 
Ambrister was given the military honor of being shot by a firing 
squad.116 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the proceedings were infected with 
significant jurisdictional and procedural errors.  In particular, both 
men were convicted of “aiding, abetting, and comforting the 
enemy” and “supplying them with the means of war,” while being 
“subject[s] of Great Britain.”117  In addition, Arbuthnot was 
convicted of “[e]xciting and stirring up the Creek Indians to war 
against the United States,” whereas Ambrister was convicted of 
“[l]eading and commanding the Lower Creek Indians in carrying 
on a war against the United States.”118 
Unlike Ambrister, Arbuthnot requested the appointment of 
counsel and mounted a vigorous defense on the merits.  Except for 
a series of letters which showed that he had repeatedly advocated 
for the Seminoles’ treaty rights and attempted to dissuade them 
from engaging in an armed conflict that they were certain to lose,119 
the evidence against Arbuthnot consisted almost entirely of 
hearsay that conspicuously tracked the prosecution’s theory of the 
 
115 Id. 
116 See Rosen, supra note 52, at 563 (describing the circumstances surrounding 
Ambrister and Arbuthnot’s executions); see also HEIDLER & HEIDLER, supra note 55, 
at 156 (same). 
117 Robert Butler, Adjutant General, Head-Quarters Division of the South, 
General Orders, 29 April 1818, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:734. 
118 Id. 
119 In addition to the letter advising Bowlegs that armed resistance to 
Jackson’s forces was futile, the prosecution introduced into evidence a letter from 
Arbuthnot to David Mitchell, in which he wrote that: 
In taking this liberty of addressing you . . . in behalf of the unfortunate 
Indians, believe me I have no wish but to see an end put to a war, which, 
if persisted in, I foresee must eventually be their ruin; and as they were 
not the aggressors, if, in the height of their rage, they commit excesses, 
that you will overlook them as the just ebullitions of an indignant spirit 
against an invading foe.   
Extract from Letter written by A. Arbuthnot to General Mitchell, 19 January 1818, 
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:729.  Not to belabor the obvious, but 
while this letter clearly constitutes evidence that Arbuthnot advocated on behalf 
of the Seminoles in an attempt to resolve an ongoing conflict in which, as he 
rightly says, “they were not the aggressors,” it can hardly be construed as 
evincing his intention to incite them to engage in unlawful belligerency against 
the United States.  Id. 
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case.  The chief witness against him was William Hambly, an 
employee of a rival trading company, who bitterly resented 
Arbuthnot’s competition.120  Hambly testified, over Arbuthnot’s 
objection, that he had been “told by chiefs and Indians . . . that 
[Arbuthnot] advised them to go to war with the United States, if 
they did not surrender them the lands which had been taken from 
them, and that the British government would support them in 
it.”121  He was also permitted to testify that, in his opinion, the 
Seminoles would not have “commenced the business of murder 
and depredation on the white settlements” but for Arbuthnot’s 
alleged assurances that they would receive “British protection.”122 
Other than Hambly, the most important prosecution witness 
was Peter Cook, a disgruntled former employee of Arbuthnot’s 
trading house, whose previous employer had fired him after 
 
120 See Owsley, supra note 82, at 295, 303–04 (arguing that Hambly’s 
association with the Forbes company rendered suspect the credibility of his 
testimony against Arbuthnot); see also Rosen, supra note 52, at 568 (discussing how 
those who disagreed with the trial’s outcome denounced Hambly’s and Cook’s 
testimony as unreliable given “their bias against Arbuthnot”). 
121 Testimony of William Hambly, 27 April 1818, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: 
MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:729. 
122 Id.  In another of the cruel ironies in this case, Hambly had collaborated 
with the Americans in the destruction of Negro Fort, acting “as a guide to point 
out the location of the fort’s magazines.”  Owsley, supra note 82, at 293; see also 
HEIDLER & HEIDLER, supra note 55, at 72 (chronicling how Hambly led American 
forces to the Negro Fort); Petition of the chiefs of the Lower Creek nation to 
Governor Cameron, 27 April 1818, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 
1:728 (discussing Hambly’s “instrumental” role in the destruction of the fort); The 
humble representations of the chiefs of the Creek nation to his excellency 
Governor Cameron, 27 January 1818, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 
1:723 (identifying Hambly as left “in charge of the fort at Prospect Bluff”).  
Hambly also acted as a middleman in the transactions that sold fugitive slaves 
captured at the fort back into slavery.  PORTER, supra note 76, at 20.  From the 
Seminoles’ perspective, Hambly was further implicated in the attack on Fowltown 
because he had sold supplies to the American soldiers who destroyed the village.  
HEIDLER & HEIDLER, supra note 55, at 112.  In December 1817, warriors from 
Fowltown captured Hambly and a colleague, and brought them to Bowleg’s 
Town where they were put on trial for their complicity in the Fort Negro 
massacre.  PORTER, supra note 76, at 20.  Although “[m]any suggested that they 
should be turned over to the few Choctaw survivors of the catastrophe for 
punishment[,]” the Black Seminole chief intervened and got them off “to St. 
Mark’s, where [they were kept in] ‘protective custody.’”  PORTER, supra note 76, at 
20.  Thus, Hambly survived to testify against Arbuthnot only because a Black 
Seminole leader exercised his discretion to spare Hambly from an almost certain 
death sentence. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011
03 MORISON (DO NOT DELETE) 10/30/2011  9:37 PM 
158 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 33:1 
accusing him of theft.123  To be sure, the evidence showed that 
Arbuthnot had sold a sizable quantity of gunpowder and 
ammunition to the Seminoles at Bowleg’s Town.  But as Arbuthnot 
pointed out in closing, the material was not sufficient to sustain a 
large fighting force for more than a short period, and had been sold 
to the Seminoles in the course of his regular business for hunting 
purposes, which was their primary source of food.124  In order to 
counter this innocent explanation, Cook was permitted to testify 
that, while he had never actually seen any weapons cache, he 
allegedly “was told by Bowlegs that he had a great quantity” of 
ammunition that was being kept in reserve “to fight with.”125 
In addition, the prosecution introduced a letter from Arbuthnot 
to Charles Bagot, the British Minister to the United States, bringing 
to his attention “the deplorable situation in which [the Seminoles] 
are placed by the wanton aggressions of the Americans . . . .”126  
The back of the letter contained an incriminating note, which 
appeared to be an inventory of arms and ammunition needed by 
Kenhadjo, Bowlegs, Prophet Francis, and others for the purpose of 
“attacking those Americans who have made inroads on their 
territory.”127  However, “[t]his note was never identified as having 
been written by Arbuthnot.”128 
Over and above these sorts of evidentiary deficiencies, it was 
clear to all but the most partisan observers that the tribunal lacked 
jurisdiction over both the subject matter of the proceedings and the 
defendants.  In the first place, under the existing Articles of War, 
none of the charges against the men stated a statutorily authorized 
 
123 See Owsley, supra note 82, at 295 (arguing that given Cook’s history, he 
“could [not] have been considered a reliable witness”); see also HEIDLER & HEIDLER, 
supra note 55, at 154–55 (asserting that the panel never questioned Cook’s integrity 
despite his dubious past). 
124 See, e.g., Defence (K.) of A. Arbuthnot, 26 April 1818, AMERICAN STATE 
PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:730–31 (contending the amount of gunpowder sold to 
the Seminoles would not have “lasted more than two months for hunting”).  
125 Testimony of Peter B. Cook, 26 April 1818, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: 
MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:728. 
126 Letter from A. Arbuthnot to the Honorable Charles Bagot, 27 January 
1818, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:723. 
127 Id. 
128 Owsley, supra note 82, at 295.  Although there was no evidence that 
Arbuthnot wrote the note, it would not have been a violation of the law of war for 
a non-resident alien to sell weapons to insurgents engaged in hostilities against 
the United States.  See infra text accompanying notes 146–51. 
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offense, with the exception of spying, of which Arbuthnot had 
been acquitted.129  As Speaker Henry Clay noted, Arbuthnot’s 
actions, in particular, were not wrongful in any event, because they 
merely:  
consisted in his trading, without the limits of the United 
States, with the Seminole Indians, in the accustomed 
commodities which form the subject of the Indian trade; 
and that he sought to ingratiate himself with his customers 
by espousing their interests, in regard to the provision of 
the Treaty of Ghent, which he may honestly have believed 
entitled them to the restoration of their lands.130   
Moreover, as Rep. Charles Mercer pointed out, “[i]n th[e] 
enumeration of persons subject to the cognizance of an American 
court martial, a search will be made in vain for a description 
corresponding with Arbuthnot and Ambrister, after the former had 
been acquitted of being a spy.”131  On the contrary, the charges 
against them alleged, at best, municipal offenses, which could not 
 
129 See Defence (K.) of A. Arbuthnot, 26 April 1818, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: 
MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:730 (illustrating how the defendant was not found guilty of 
“acting as a spy”); Defense (M.) of Robert Christy Ambrister, 28 April 1818, 
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:734 (stating the charges brought 
against Ambrister).  See generally Act for Establishing Rules and Articles for the 
Government of the Armies of the United States, 2 Stat. 359 (1806) (setting forth the 
regulations by which the armies of the United States were to be governed). 
130 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 641 (1819).  
Their case was not within the jurisdiction of a court martial.  Courts 
martial, among us, are but the mere creatures of positive law.  All their 
authority is derived from the statute which creates them . . . .  They can 
take cognizance of no offences whatever, except those specifically named 
in the statute. 
33 ANNALS OF CONG. 752 (statement of Henry Storrs).  
Admit the truth of the facts contained in these charges, are they declared 
penal in any part of the rules and articles of war?  Or are they therein 
declared to be proper subject matters for trial before a court martial?  If 
they were not, it follow[s] . . . that [Jackson] . . . transcended his powers 
in ordering the court, and that the court itself had stretched its powers to 
an unwarrantable length, in acting upon matters not cognizable before 
them. 
33 ANNALS OF CONG. 584–85 (statement of Thomas Cobb). 
131 See 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 817 (1819) (“Even where a particular offence is 
cognizable by a court martial, the character ‘of the person determines whether it 
may be tried by a civil or military tribunal.’”(quoting ALEXANDER MACOMB, A 
TREATISE ON MARTIAL LAW AND COURTS MARTIAL 19 (1809)). 
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properly reach foreign nationals who owed no duty of allegiance to 
the United States.  As Rep. Philip Reed explained: 
These offenses can only apply . . . to our own citizens or 
others within the limits or the territories of the United 
States, who may engage in . . . unlawful acts against the 
public authority.  The law provides for offences of this sort 
[conspiracies, confederacies, and combinations], but it 
cannot apply to persons out of the limits of the United 
States, owing no obligations or allegiance to the United 
States.132 
Jackson’s supporters in Congress certainly made an effort to 
justify his actions by claiming that he could have executed the men 
without any due process, and that the tribunal should be construed 
as merely an advisory “council of war,” which Jackson was free to 
disregard in his discretion.  The Government strikes a similar pose 
of uncertainty, stating, “it is not even clear at this juncture whether 
the military tribunal which tried them was a court martial or a 
military commission.”133  But aside from the fact that the concept of 
a military commission as we currently know it was invented by 
Major General Winfield Scott during the Mexican War in 1847,134 
this sort of equivocation is a fairly desperate dodge, because no 
one doubted that the proceedings were considered a court martial 
until it became clear, in hindsight, that his actions were legally 
indefensible under that rubric. 
After all, Jackson’s own order affirming the convictions had 
denominated the tribunal a “special court-martial.”135  Moreover, 
 
132 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 1069 (1819). 
133 Gov’t Response (al Bahlul), supra note 7, at 25–26; Gov’t Response 
(Hamdan), supra note 31, at 18. 
134 See WINTHROP, supra note 7, at 822–23, 832 (describing the U.S. occupation 
of Mexico during the Mexican War and Major General Scott’s institution of 
martial law and military commissions); see also David Glazier, Precedents Lost: The 
Neglected History of the Military Commission, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 5, 31–40 (2005) (same). 
135 Robert Butler, Adjutant General, Head-Quarters Division of the South, 
General Orders, 29 April 1818, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:734; 
see also 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 645–46 (1819) (arguing that Jackson “evidently 
intended to proceed under the rules and articles of war” and that the tribunal 
“understood itself to be acting as a court martial”); id. at 815–17, 1086 (arguing 
that the tribunal bore the traditional indicia of a court martial); id. at 891–92 
(arguing that the tribunal “was a court martial, and was so considered by the 
General who ordered it, and the officers who sat upon it”); id. at 1067 
 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol33/iss1/3
03 MORISON (DO NOT DELETE) 10/30/2011  9:37 PM 
2011] AMERICAN MILITARY JUSTICE 161 
several days after the executions, in a revealing self-congratulatory 
letter to Calhoun, Jackson did not intimate that the proceedings 
had been anything other than an ordinary exercise of military 
justice.  In typically florid terms, he explained that Arbuthnot and 
Ambrister had been:  
tried under my orders by a special court of select officers, 
legally convicted as exciters of this savage and negro war, 
legally condemned, and most justly punished for their 
iniquities.  The proceedings of the court martial in this case, 
with the volume of testimony justifying their 
condemnation, present scenes of wickedness, corruption, 
and barbarity, at which the heart sickens . . . .136 
Two years later, after the congressional debates had revealed 
the poverty of that position, Jackson adopted the view of his 
supporters, namely that the tribunal had never been intended to be 
a court martial.  “In organizing the court of inquiry,” he wrote in 
his response to the report of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, 
“it was only intended (as in councils of war) that the opinion [of 
the panel members] should operate directory, and as advice, not to 
become binding.”137  As a result, the most serious charge against 
him, the decision to order Ambrister’s execution despite the 
contrary verdict of the panel members, had been entirely 
appropriate.  “Besides, Ambrister was the most criminal,” Jackson 
added, because he had the temerity to have “commanded, in 
person, a corps of negroes, with the view of anticipating [his] 
occupation of St. Marks . . . .”138 
 
(characterizing the tribunal as “to all intents and purposes, a general court 
martial”). 
136 Letter from Major General Andrew Jackson to Secretary of War J.C. 
Calhoun, 5 May 1818, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:702.  The 
Government suggests that there is some legitimate doubt as to whether the 
tribunal was a court martial by citing William Birkhimer’s treatise on military law.  
Gov’t Response (al Bahlul), supra note 7, at 26 n.15; Gov’t Response (Hamdan), 
supra note 31, at 18 n.41.  But Birkhimer’s analysis is suspect, because he simply 
adopts in toto the revisionist Jacksonian view, which ignores the contemporaneous 
designation that Jackson himself used to describe the tribunal. 
137 Memorial of Andrew Jackson to the United States Senate, 23 February 
1820, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:758. 
138 Id.  Of course, if this is true, one wonders why the panel bothered to 
render its decision in the form of a verdict, as opposed to issuing a set of factual 
findings.  Under the extant Articles of War, a “court of inquiry” was limited to a 
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Indeed, it is highly instructive that Jackson’s supporters made 
no serious attempt to defend his actions as a legitimate assertion of 
court martial jurisdiction, perhaps because the charge sheets 
conspicuously omitted any reference to the existing Articles of 
War.  Nevertheless, at least two provisions of the code might have 
been logical candidates.  Articles 45 and 46 (now codified as Article 
104) prohibited anyone (“whosoever”) from “reliev[ing] the enemy 
with money, victuals, or ammunition” and “hold[ing] 
correspondence with, or giv[ing] intelligence to, the enemy.”139  
Yet, it apparently never occurred to Jackson’s supporters to argue 
that Arbuthnot and Ambrister’s actions had violated these 
statutory provisions, although the allegations might easily have 
been couched in those terms.  The obvious reason, as already 
noted, is that “[t]he offenses . . . which are the subject of these two 
Articles” were commonly understood to be “treasonable in their 
nature,” which necessarily presupposes that they cannot be 
committed by foreign nationals owing no duty of allegiance to the 
United States.140 
Instead, Jackson’s allies in Congress typically avoided “offering 
a systematic legal argument for excluding Arbuthnot and 
Ambrister from the protections of the law,” but rather “were 
content to aver that no law at all protected the two men because 
they themselves had acted illegally, without being explicit about 
 
maximum of three commissioned officers, whose function was “to reduce the 
proceedings and evidence to writing,” but were generally not permitted to “give 
their opinion on the merits of the case . . . .”  Act for Establishing Rules and 
Articles for the Gov’t of Armies of the U.S., art. 91, 2 Stat. 370 (1806).  Moreover, 
the Articles provided that the use of such bodies was disfavored, because 
Congress recognized that they “may be perverted to dishonorable purposes, and 
may be considered as engines of destruction to military merit, in the hands of 
weak and envious commandants . . . .”  Act for Establishing Rules and Articles for 
the Gov’t of Armies of the U.S., art. 92, 2 Stat. 370 (1806).  As such, courts of 
inquiry were prohibited “unless directed by the President of the United States, or 
demanded by the accused.”  Id.  Needless to say, Jackson did not bother to follow 
these procedural rules either.  In any event, if the panel really was intended to be 
an advisory body, then it did not function as a judicial tribunal of any sort, much 
less a “regularly constituted court,” and its advice thus cannot plausibly serve as 
precedent for criminal proceedings in a modern military commission.  Arguably, 
the Government cannot have it both ways.  
139 WINTHROP, supra note 7, at 629.  
140 Id.; see also 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 618 (1819) (“The fifty-sixth and seventh 
articles cannot be construed to extend to foreigners, but are evidently intended to 
operate on our own citizens only, who shall be found guilty of aiding, abetting, 
comforting, or corresponding with the enemy.”). 
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what made them outlaws . . . .  Jackson’s allies derided their 
opponents’ arguments as narrowly legalistic, and . . . generally 
adopted aggressive antilegalist positions.”141  This position should 
temper any comfort the Government derives from the fact that 
Congress, divided sharply along partisan lines, failed to censure 
Jackson, which hardly constitutes a ringing vindication of the 
legality of his conduct.  Tellingly, once the political crisis had 
passed, the next Congress (including eighteen members who had 
taken Jackson’s side in the censure debate) quietly voted to 
eliminate his position as a Major General under the guise of 
reducing the size of the Army in a cost-cutting measure.  
“Ostensibly in the interest of the budget,” Heidler notes, Congress 
thus “removed Andrew Jackson from the military establishment of 
the United States” with the assent of President Monroe and 
Secretary Calhoun.142 
Lastly, even if one assumes (against the weight of the evidence) 
that the tribunal was intended to be a military commission, rather 
than an illegally constituted court martial, Jackson’s rationalization 
for the executions was cast in sweeping and ambiguous terms.  “It 
is an established principle of the law of nations,” Jackson asserted, 
“that any individual of a nation making war against the citizens of 
another nation, they being at peace, forfeits his allegiance, and 
becomes an outlaw and pirate . . . .”143 
While it is not entirely clear what Jackson meant to assert, he 
cannot be reasonably interpreted as literally accusing Arbuthnot 
and Ambrister of piracy, which as he surely knew was defined as 
robbery on the high seas.144  Nor could the pair technically have 
been described as “outlaws” as that term was understood at 
common law.145  Instead, the most plausible interpretation of 
 
141 Rosen, supra note 52, at 577–79. 
142 Heidler, supra note 56, at 529.  The idea of eliminating Jackson’s position 
had been proposed as an alternative to censure during the House debate.  See 33 
ANNALS OF CONG. 799 (1819) (“The adoption of the resolution is . . . essential to the 
preservation of our present Military Establishment.  If the resolutions fail, the 
army ought to be, and will be reduced.”). 
143 Robert Butler, Adjutant General, Head-Quarters Division of the South, 
General Orders, 29 April 1818, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 1:734.  
144 See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 162 (1820) (Story, J.) 
(holding that “piracy, by the law of nations, is robbery upon the sea”). 
145 If a defendant repeatedly failed to appear after being indicted, a writ of 
outlawry could be issued to compel his submission to the court’s jurisdiction.  In 
the medieval period, this must have been a frightening prospect because it put the 
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Jackson’s dictum is that, by voluntarily taking sides in a conflict in 
which their own government was neutral, Arbuthnot and 
Ambrister had been engaged in a kind of illegitimate, private 
warfare.  As a result, like pirates captured on the high seas, Jackson 
regarded them as de facto stateless persons who had forfeited the 
protection of the law and were therefore subject to summary 
battlefield execution. 
Aside from the fact that no military exigency justified 
depriving the defendants of the rudimentary incidents of due 
process, it is by no means clear that Arbuthnot and Ambrister had 
engaged in hostilities against the United States.  In particular, 
Jackson’s purported outrage that British neutrals would supply 
goods and services to the Seminoles was flatly inconsistent with 
the prevailing American understanding of the law of neutrality.  
Throughout the nineteenth century, the United States was the 
leading proponent of the freedom of neutral commerce,146 a policy 
it would consistently maintain even when it was in the position of 
a belligerent.147  As early as 1796, when the French foreign minister 
insisted that the United States was obligated to prevent its 
merchants from selling contraband goods to the British, Attorney 
General Charles Lee advised President Washington that: 
 
offender beyond the protection of the law and the offender thus “might be killed 
with impunity and his lands forfeited to the state.”  G. S. Rowe, Outlawry in 
Pennsylvania, 1782-1788 and the Achievement of an Independent State Judiciary, 20 AM. 
J. LEGAL HIST. 227, 229 (1976).  Even so, the practice of subjecting fugitives to 
summary execution was effectively prohibited by judicial decision by the late 14th 
century.  See Ralph B. Pugh, Early Registers of English Outlaws, 27 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 319, 319 (1983) (“Until Edward III’s early days offenders could be killed on 
sight, but thenceforth, by an oblique judicial decision, such a fate was effectively 
forbidden . . . .”). 
146 See William C. Morley, The Sale of Munitions of War, 10 AM. J. INT’L L. 467, 
472 (1916) (“It was the policy of the United States, more than any other single 
influence, that tended to give definiteness to [the law of neutrality].  In the midst 
of the European wars that followed the French Revolution, the United States was 
the chief neutral nation whose commercial rights were placed in jeopardy.”). 
147 See 2 JAMES W. GARNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WORLD WAR 384–85 
(1920). 
The policy of the United States, when it was a belligerent, in respect of 
the right of neutrals to sell and export munitions of war, has uniformly 
been in accordance with the view which it has defended as a neutral, and 
it does not appear that in any war in which t was a belligerent formal 
protest by the government against the furnishing of war supplies to the 
enemy was ever made. 
Id.  
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If a citizen of a neutral State, for hire, serves as a mariner on 
board of a neutral ship employed in contraband commerce 
with either of the belligerent powers, he is not . . . 
punishable personally, according to the law of nations, 
though taken in the fact, by that belligerent nation to whose 
detriment the prohibited trade would operate.  In such a 
case, the contraband merchandise, and the vessel too, 
(unless excepted by treaty,) may be seized and confiscated;  
. . . but the mariner, rendering personal service, suffers no 
penalty or loss whatever . . . .148 
The same rule applied when the contraband goods were being 
furnished to insurgents waging an undeclared war of 
independence against their sovereign.  Thus, in the context of a 
conflict between Spain and rebels in the colony of Buenos Aries, 
Justice Story merely expressed the conventional view when he 
observed that: 
[T]here is nothing in our laws, or in the law of nations, that 
forbids our citizens from sending armed vessels, as well as 
munitions of war, to foreign ports for sale.  It is a 
commercial adventure which no nation is bound to 
prohibit; and which only exposes the persons engaged in it 
to the penalty of confiscation.149 
Accordingly, Arbuthnot and Ambrister’s provision of material 
support to the Seminoles did not necessarily violate their neutral 
status vis-à-vis the United States.  By all appearances, Ambrister’s 
training program had been directed primarily at Spain, and when 
the actual fighting began, he withdrew rather than take up arms 
against Jackson’s forces.  Meanwhile, Arbuthnot’s sale of goods to 
the Seminoles in the ordinary course of his business was clearly 
 
148 Neutrality, 1 Op. Att’y. Gen. 61, 62 (1796); see also 7 JOHN B. MOORE, A 
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 955–73 (1906) (citing additional U.S. diplomatic 
sources). 
149 Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 340 (1822). 
[N]eutrals may lawfully sell, at home, to a belligerent purchaser, or 
carry, themselves, to the belligerent powers, contraband articles subject 
to the right of seizure, in transit. . . .  The right of the neutral to transport, 
and of the hostile power to seize, are conflicting rights, and neither party 
can charge the other with a criminal act. 
See also 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 141–42 (1840) (1826). 
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legitimate neutral commerce, even if the Seminoles used them in 
combat.  As subsequently codified in the Hague Neutrality 
Convention of 1907, which was merely declaratory of extant 
international law,150 “[s]upplies furnished or loans made to one of 
the belligerents” were not considered “hostile acts against [the 
other] belligerent,” provided the supplier violated no duty of 
allegiance by reason of his presence in territory under the 
jurisdiction of the injured State.151 
Moreover, Jackson’s dictum begs the question in any event 
because the mere fact that the citizen of a neutral State abandons 
his neutrality is not ipso facto a violation of the law of war.  It is 
perfectly true, of course, that private citizens do not have a license 
to engage in acts of violence in the context of an armed conflict.  
Private citizens who commit acts of violence “without the 
authority or sanction of their own government,” Henry Halleck 
explained on the eve of the Civil War, are not considered “enemies, 
legitimately in arms,” and thus are not entitled “to plead the laws 
of war in . . . justification” of their actions.152  In the absence of 
combatant immunity, it follows that “when captured, they are not 
treated as prisoners of war, but as criminals, subject to the 
punishment due their crimes.”153  Hence, “[t]he taking of property 
by such forces . . . is not a belligerent act authorized by the law of 
nations, but a robbery,” and “the killing of an enemy by such forces 
. . . is not an act of war, but a murder,” unless the defendant acted in 
self-defense.154  And while civilian offenses of this sort might be 
tried by military authorities in circumstances justifying the 
imposition of martial law or military government, Halleck does not 
suggest that such defendants, though “regarded as outlaws” in a 
colloquial sense, were placed beyond the pale of due process.155  
 
150 See generally Hague Convention V Respecting the Rights and Duties of 
Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310, 1 
Bevans 654 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1910).  
151 Id. art. 17–18.  
152 HALLECK, supra note 32, at 386.  
153 Id. at 386–87. 
154 Id. at 386.   
155 Id. at 387; see also WINTHROP, supra note 7, at 842 (explaining that military 
commissions “will ordinarily and properly be governed, upon all important 
questions, by the established rules and principles of law and evidence.  Where 
essential, indeed, to a full investigation or to the doing of justice, these rules and 
principles will be liberally construed and applied”); Jno. C. Kelton, Assistant 
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Thus, even on the counterfactual assumption that Arbuthnot and 
Ambrister were “individuals waging private war,” Henry Clay 
observed, they were not properly subject to the jurisdiction of 
Jackson’s military tribunal, but rather “should have been turned 
over to the civil authority.”156 
Conversely, Clay’s analysis continued, if one assumes that 
Arbuthnot and Ambrister abandoned their neutral status by 
directly joining the Seminoles’ cause, they were no more subject to 
immediate execution than the Seminoles themselves: 
A foreigner, connecting himself with a belligerent, becomes 
an enemy of the party to whom that belligerent is opposed, 
subject to whatever he may be subject, entitled to whatever 
he is entitled.  Arbuthnot and Ambrister, by associating 
themselves, became identified with the Indians; they 
became our enemies, and . . . all that we could possibly 
have a right to do was to apply to them the rules which we 
had a right to enforce against the Indians. . . . [I]f the law 
regulating Indian hostilities . . . [gives us] no moral right to 
retaliate upon them, we consequently had no right to 
retaliate upon Arbuthnot and Ambrister.157 
 
Adjutant-Gen., Hdqrs. Dept. of the Missouri, General Orders No. 1 (Jan. 1, 1862), 
in 1 WAR OF REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION 
AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, 247, 248 (Series 2, 1894) (promulgating order of Maj. 
Gen. Halleck directing that military commissions “should be . . . constituted in a 
similar manner and their proceedings be conducted according to the same general 
rules as courts-martial in order to prevent abuses which might otherwise arise”). 
156 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 641 (1819).  
157 Id. at 641–42.  This principle of parity is also supported by the Hague 
Convention, which provides that if a neutral citizen “enlists in the ranks of the 
armed force of one of the parties . . . [he] shall not be more severely treated by the 
belligerent as against whom he has abandoned his neutrality than a national of 
the other belligerent State could be for the same act.”  See Hague Convention V 
Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War 
on Land, supra note 150, at art. 17(b).  
If war be declared by the Cherokee nation, and one of them kill one of 
the people against whom the war is declared, he is not therefore subject 
to be punished as a criminal, because he is acting under the authority 
and laws of his nation.  He can not, by carrying on war against us, be 
treated as a traitor or rebel . . . . 
Holland v. Pack, 7 Tenn. (Peck) 151, 153 (1823); WINTHROP, supra note 7, at 639, 
667, 670, 778 (noting that the laws of war apply to armed conflict with an Indian 
tribe). 
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Indeed, as the House Military Affairs Committee pointed out, 
the implications of Jackson’s dictum were quite far reaching.  If this 
was a correct statement of the law of war, it would imply that 
“Lafayette, who volunteered his services in the cause of America, 
in the war which established our independence, forfeited his 
allegiance, became an outlaw, and subjected himself to an 
ignominious death, had he fallen into the hands of the English.”158 
6. CONCLUSION 
The judgment of history has not been kind to Andrew Jackson’s 
conduct during the First Seminole War.  As one historian 
summarizes the evidence, “his actions were a study in flagrant 
disobedience, gross inequality, and premeditated ruthlessness. . . . 
He swept through Florida, crushed the Indians, executed . . . 
Arbuthnot and Ambrister, and . . . violated nearly every standard 
of justice.”159  Not surprisingly, once the Government’s embrace of 
this episode as a precedent for a contemporary war crimes 
prosecution filtered into the public consciousness, it prompted a 
sharply-worded response from the Native American community.  
In a letter submitted to the court, the National Congress of 
American Indians (NCAI) castigated the prosecutors’ decision to 
rely on a direct comparison between the Seminoles and al Qaeda as 
“an astonishing statement of revisionist history,” which, in turn, 
“calls into question the reasoning and judgment of those who are 
representing the United States in this case.”160 
Stung by this criticism, the Government filed a rejoinder to the 
NCAI’s letter, but its attempt at “clarification” arguably descends 
from the merely offensive into incoherence.  Perhaps most 
importantly, the Government flatly contradicts itself by suggesting 
 
158 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 517 (1819).  
159 Bertram Wyatt-Brown, Andrew Jackson’s Honor, 17 J. EARLY REP. 1, 3 (1997) 
(quoting historian John William Ward). 
160 Brief for National Congress of American Indians as Amicus Curiae to 
Appellee, United States v. al Bahlul at *1-2, CMCR Case No. 09-001, 2011 WL 
3836524 (U.S. Ct. Mil. Comm’n Rev. Mar. 17, 2011).  In addition, representatives of 
the 3,600 living descendants of the Seminoles wrote letters to President Obama 
and Secretary of Defense Gates protesting the Government’s brief.  See generally 
Letter from Mitchell Cypress, Chairman, Seminole Tribe of Fla., to Barack Obama, 
President of the United States (Mar. 24, 2011) (on file with author); Letter from Jim 
Shore, General Counsel, Seminole Tribe of Fla., to Robert M. Gates, United States 
Secretary of Defense (Mar. 24, 2011) (on file with author). 
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that it had never intended to “equate the conduct of the Seminoles . 
. . with that of al Qaeda and its affiliated terrorist groups,” which 
abandons the major premise of the argument.161  We should recall, 
if need be, that this is an exercise in the familiar common law 
method of reasoning by analogy.  Hence, if the conduct of the 
Seminoles and their black allies during the First Seminole War is 
not relevantly similar to the tactics employed by present-day 
terrorists, as the Government belatedly seems to concede, it follows 
that the execution of Arbuthnot and Ambrister was based on the 
mistaken belief that they were aiding “savages” engaged in an 
unlawful belligerency.  And in that case, it is unreasonable to 
conclude that their deaths were anything other than a tragedy. 
The Government attempts to resist this conclusion by further 
abandoning any pretense of moral legitimacy, arguing instead that 
the executions are not being cited “as an example of moral right, 
but as legal precedent; the morality or propriety of General 
Jackson’s military operation in Florida is irrelevant.”162  While 
allowing that “Jackson’s campaign into northern Florida in 1818, 
and his treatment of the Seminoles during that campaign” were 
“repugnan[t],” the Government makes the striking claim that “the 
relevance of the Ambrister and Arbuthnot precedent” is grounded 
on nothing more than “Jackson’s treatment of those acts as 
violations of the law of war,” which was subsequently ratified by 
“the then-Secretary of State and the then-President of the United 
States.”163  “[F]or the purposes of this case,” the Government 
submits, “the true facts concerning . . . Jackson’s campaign into 
northern Florida” may be safely “[p]ut[] aside.”164  We are thus 
entitled to conclude that the legal basis of the Government’s 
assertion of military jurisdiction over material support charges 
rests entirely on a naked exercise of power by a general officer, 
divorced entirely from the constraints of moral principle, in the 
 
161 Appellee’s Response to Letter Brief Amicus Curiae of National Congress 
of American Indians [hereinafter Government’s Response to NCAI] at 1–2, United 
States v. al Bahlul, CMCR Case No. 09-001, 2011 WL 3836524 (U.S. Ct. Mil. 
Comm’n Rev. Mar. 21, 2011).  It is simply not possible to square this denial with 
the Government’s initial response to the court’s certified questions, in which it 
equates the Seminole’s conduct with the conduct of al-Qaeda.  See also supra text 
accompanying notes 43–46. 
162 Government’s Response to NCAI, supra note 161, at 2. 
163 Id. (emphasis added). 
164 Id. (emphasis added). 
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context of a war of aggression waged to vindicate the property 
rights of antebellum Southern slaveholders. 
For the Government to suggest that this precedent remains 
good law in a modern war crimes prosecution is not unlike citing 
Dred Scott for the sanctity of property rights, while remaining 
willfully blind to the fact that it has been decisively repudiated as a 
respectable constitutional precedent.  Indeed, Dred Scott has never 
been formally overruled by the Supreme Court, and one might 
even construct a plausible argument that, viewed in its historical 
context, the case was “correctly” decided given the existing state of 
the law.165  But while that might be an interesting pedagogical 
exercise, an experienced constitutional lawyer would surely 
consider it a professional gaffe to cite the decision on its merits in a 
living case.  “There is a broader point that extends beyond 
doctrinal minutiae,” Jamal Greene writes, “Dred Scott does not 
gnaw at us because it misused syllogism or invented constitutional 
rights; we hate it because it abided constitutional evil.”166  The 
decision to reject such a case from the canon of acceptable 
precedent thus involves a deliberative moral judgment that 
expresses “the attitude the [relevant] constitutional interpretive 
community takes toward the ethical propositions that the decision 
has come to represent.”167  The cases that fail to satisfy this 
normative test “are not the law; they are its opposite.  Their 
holdings cannot reasonably be relied upon . . . .”168 
From a critical moral perspective, my suggestion is that in its 
zeal to defend a tenuous legal theory, the Government has 
overlooked the profound conceptual difference between history 
and tradition.  As Stephen Macedo observes, “[a] nation’s history 
[including its legal history] is simply the record of its past, some 
good, some bad.  America’s history includes lynching and racism 
and other practices that no decent and reasonable person could be 
 
165 See generally MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 1 (2006) (arguing that “the result in Dred Scott . . . may have 
been constitutionally correct” as decided, in light of the fact that the 
“constitutional text and tradition [were] saturated with concessions to evil”).  
166 Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 
*31), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1776488.   
167 Id. at *2. 
168 Id. at *3. 
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proud of.”169  America’s tradition, on the other hand, “is made up 
of those practices and ideals that her people properly take pride in.  
Tradition is a critical distillation of the past, a rendering that seeks 
to be true not to the past entire but to what is best in it, to what is 
most honourable and most worth carrying forward.”170   
 A legal tradition thus has a certain moral authority that makes 
a claim on our allegiance, insofar as it embodies a conception of 
justice that coheres “with our deeper understanding of ourselves 
and our aspirations, and our realization that, given our history and 
the traditions embedded in our public life, it is the most reasonable 
doctrine for us.”171  In this sense, we should be loath to accept the 
Government’s jarring invitation to incorporate Andrew Jackson’s 
summary trial and execution of two innocent men into the 
tradition of American military justice.172 
 
169 STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE, AND COMMUNITY 
IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 171 (1990). 
170 Id. 
171 John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 515, 519 
(1980). 
172  As this essay was about to go to press, the CMCR issued its long awaited 
decisions in Hamdan and al Bahlul.  In Hamdan, the court uncritically accepted 
the Government’s assertion that this incident supports the proposition that 
material support for “irregular warfare” is an established war crime, even where 
the defendant owes no duty of allegiance to the injured State, albeit professing to 
take “no comfort in the historical context in which these events occurred.”  United 
States v. Hamdan, No. 09-002, 2011 WL 2923945, at *29 (U.S. Ct. Mil. Comm’n Rev. 
June 24, 2011) (en banc).  To be sure, the court cites a variety of additional legal 
materials that purportedly support its holding, including cases that the 
Government had conceded were irrelevant, while conspicuously omitting any 
reference to the contrary authority cited by the appellant.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 32–42.  In al Bahlul, the court also affirmed the appellant’s 
conviction for providing material support for terrorism, but omitted any reference 
to Jackson’s execution of Arbuthnot and Ambrister.  See United States v. al Bahlul, 
No. 09-001, 2011 WL 4916373 (U.S. Ct. Mil. Comm’n Rev. Sept. 9, 2011) (en banc).  
A full analysis of these opinions is beyond the scope of this essay.  I am content to 
allow readers to exercise their own judgment, in light of the evidence presented 
here, about whether the CMCR’s reliance on this precedent undermines the 
persuasive authority of its reasoning.  
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